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Conflicting representations on Armenian genocide: 
exploring the relational future 
through self-inquiring technique1
Cătălin Mamali*, Mircea Kivu**, Jan Kutnik*** 
Abstract: Major lethal conflicts (war crimes, genocides) between large 
social actors include many times opposing social representations, 
narratives and practical approaches to the events worked out 
by those placed on the aggressor or aggressed, perpetrators or 
victims’ side. War crimes and genocides seem to be historically 
associated, mainly in the case of dictatorial regimes, with system-
atic repression not only of the information about such events but 
also of the interrogative potential of common people about the 
1 This research has been carried out without the financial sup-
port of any formal or informal organization or sponsor. We express 
our thanks to Alina Alak, Petar Bojanic, Fatih Bukun, Christopher 
B. Budzisz, Fatih Bukun, Daniel Chirot, David Cochran, Ahmet 
Demirdağ, Charles Hill, Vladimíra Dvořáková, Joergen Friedrichs, 
F. Müge Gőçek Stefan Ihrig, Ingrid Lambru –Mercury Research, Mar-
itza Montero, Ioana Predoescu, Verjine Svazlian. We are grateful 
to Marcin Byczyński for his critical observations, and to all the Partic-
ipants for their contribution without any material reward. The study 
has been presented at ISSP, Edinburgh 2017: ISPP AT 40: REVISIT-
ING CORE THEMES OF TYRANNY, INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
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events. The study proposes that such conflicting representations 
cannot be approached only by questions pre-established by the 
researchers to which the participants are supposed to answer. 
Methodologically and theoretically it is justified to explore the 
assumptions and the questions that can be triggered by the pres-
entation of conflicts to the participants who are supposed to look 
to	the	same	conflict	from	both	sides.	Besides	the	use	of	national	
representative samples and of convenience samples before and 
after	the	100	years	commemoration	of	the	1915	Armenian	geno-
cide the study presents the findings based on self-inquiry tech-
nique	applied	at	three	levels	of	social	complexity:	(a)	societal	
level, with questions directed to the general universe of discourse 
implied	by	the	1915	events;	(b)	at	interpersonal	level	with	ques-
tions directed to actors with leading roles on both sides; (c) at 
the	individual	level	stimulating	questions	about	1915	genocide	
that are explicitly self-directed. We suggest, based on the find-
ings, that the expression of the questioning potential on trag-
ic events is useful for the relational future of the sides involved 
in the conflicts.
Keywords: accuracy of historical knowledge, alchemical language, con-
flicting representations, interrogative orientation. answer (knowl-
edge) certainty
Introduction
Tragic historical events triggered by human actions and 
specifically by massacres, ethnic cleansing and genocides 
are represented in various ways by the sides involved as 
perpetrators, victims, active witnesses, bystanders and 
interventionists in the conflict. The spectrum of the social 
representations about mega-tragedies varies from their rel-
ative convergence, when they are recognized by the main 
parts and by other major social actors to an extreme diver-
gence of such representations that are marked on one hand 
by denial (the perpetrators side, their historical successors) 
and by relentless efforts from the part of the survivors for 
the recognition of their losses. The conflicts between oppo-
site social representations on genocides are qualitatively 
different from other social representations that are focused 
on other kinds of conflicts such as territorial claims, pri-
ority, economic, cultural and financial litigious issues. 
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In the case of massacres and genocides the future of the 
existential relations between the two sides (victims-per-
petrators) and even their post genocide co-existence the 
accurate representation of and the just attitude toward 
the past evens are elementary pre-conditions for a minimal 
normalization of their relationships. The accurate repre-
sentations of and the just attitudes toward massacres and 
genocides are difficult epistemic and political tasks espe-
cially when they remain also unfinished jobs. This is one 
of the reasons for the widespread view according to which 
“the	past	cannot	be	predicted”,	its	representations	being	
under the distorting pressure of present economic and 
political interests that are changing. Research and educa-
tional publications (manuals) worked out within various 
countries, and by authors who have different identities 
belonging to one or the other side of a conflict frequent-
ly contain not only different accounts of the same events 
but opposite accounts. However, there are few basic ques-
tions	that	can	be	answered	such	as:	who	did	initiate	the	
tragic	events?	Who	has	been	the	aggressor	and	who	has	
been	the	aggressed?	What	side	has	carried	the	role	of	per-
petrator	and	what	side	has	been	the	victim?	Is	the	tragic	
event	a	genocide	or	something	less	than	a	genocide?	Gen-
ocides, massacres and crimes against humanity are much 
older tragic realities than the conceptual and legal tools 
worked	out	to	cope	with	them	Between	denial	of	genocides	
and basic accurate historical knowledge on genocides there 
is a deep epistemic, political and moral tension that invites 
questions and answers. The approaches this tension tak-
ing into account the answer (knowledge) certainty and the 
questioning potential.
Opposite grand narratives and cognitive dissonance and social-cognitive conflicts 
within and between collective actors
Individuals as well as nations are producers and consum-
ers of narratives about themselves and their relations with 
other actors. The narratives have essential functions such 
as therapeutic, solidarity maintenance, identity formation 
and affirmation, at the various levels of social complexity. 
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For instance, Harvey et al.2 suggest that in the case of per-
sonal and interpersonal traumatic events “completion of the 
story”	is	a	necessary	step	for	reaching	closure	and	for	the	
becoming of one’s own identity. However, at societal level 
the functions of narratives are much more complex because 
they are focused on collective actors and individual’s relation 
with the group identity and they encompass long historical 
periods that go far beyond one or a few generations. Ass-
mann3,	Leerssen4,	and	Rüsen5 underscored the importance 
of	“grand	narratives”,	“macro-narratives”	and	iconic	rep-
resentations that involve different collective actors during 
long-historical periods. Many times mega-traumatic events 
such as massacres, genocides, crimes against humanity are 
represented in different ways by the perpetrators and by the 
victims, by the aggressors and the aggressed.
Frequently the aggressed are not allowed to tell their sto-
ry, and the aggressors practice soft and violet forms of deni-
al. For instance, the narratives of the oppressors and the 
oppressed of South Africa on the historical events are oppo-
site.	The	narratives	of	the	native	Indians	from	the	Canadi-
an territories are radically different from most of the official 
narratives as it is suggested in the landmark research car-
ried	by	Chataway.	She	mentions	that	aboriginal	people	
in	Canada	often	say	that	thy	have	been	“researched to death”	
and that this must change because “it’s time that we [the 
dominated, the victims, the displaced, parenthesis added] 
2	 J.H.	Harvey,	T.L.	Orbuch,	A.	Weber,	“Introduction:	Convergence	
of	the	Attribution	and	Accounts	Concepts	in	the	Study	of	Close	Rela-
tionships”,	in:	J.	H.	Harvey,	T.	L.	Orbuch,	A.	Weber	(eds),	Attribu-
tions, Accounts, and Close Relationships,	Springer,	New	York–Berlin	
1990,	p.	50.
3 J. Assmann, The Mind of Egypt. History and Meaning in the 
Time of Pharaohs,	Metropolitan	Books,	Henry	Holt	Company,	New	
York	2002.
4	 J.	Leerssen,	“Imagology:	History	and	Method”,	in:	M.	Beller,	
J.	Leerssen	(eds),	Imagology: The Cultural Construction of Literary 
Representation of National Characters. A Critical Survey. Series Stu-
dia Imagologica	2007,	vol.	13,	pp.	17–32.
5	 J.	Rüsen,	“How	To	Overcome	Ethnocentrism:	Approaches	
To	a	Culture	of	Recognition	By	History	in	the	Twenty-first	Centu-
ry”,	History and Theory	2004,	Theme	Issue	14,	Wesleyan	University,	
pp.	118–129.
172 | Cătălin Mamali, Mircea Kivu, Jan Kutnik |
started researching ourselves back to life”.6 Such situations, 
quite frequent, pose the question of the abuse by dominant 
groups of scientific research methods for macro-societal 
manipulations of present and past events and increas-
es the need for the democratization of the social research 
process.7 Such questions might emerge even in the cases 
of overwhelmingly documented and also legally assessed 
and recognized genocides. For instance, research on “diver-
gent	narratives”	on	Holocaust8 suggests that such narratives 
pose difficult problems to the re-construction of inter-group 
relations. In all these cases the question of “acknowledg-
ment	after	mass	violence”	becomes	unavoidable	and	a	nec-
essary component of the wellbeing of those involved in such 
tragedies.9 In their on line experimental study10 that select-
ed	Armenian	Genocide,	Kielce	Pogrom	and	Holocaust	found	
out that the “effects of acknowledgement on willingness for 
reconciliation”	are	significant	in	all	these	cases.11
There are, unfortunately, many examples of contradicto-
ry narratives that deal with various forms of violent actions 
as	aggressive	wars	(French	against	the	–Vietnamese,	Japa-
nese	against	Chinese	etc.)	and	such	contradictory	narratives	
are conflicting since ancient times to nowadays, as Abler12, 
 6	 C.J.	Chataway,	Imposed Democracy: Political Alienation and 
Perceptions of Justice in an Aboriginal Community. A thesis presented 
to	the	Department	of	Psychology	in	partial	fulfillment	of	the	require-
ments	for	a	degree	of	Doctor	in	Philosophy	in	the	subject	of	Social	
Psychology.	Harvard	University,	Cambridge,	MA	1994,	p.	54.
 7	 C.	Mamali,	“Democratization	of	the	Social	Research	Process”,	
in:	P.	Stringer	(ed.),	Confronting Social Issues: Applications of Social 
Psychology,	Academic	Press,	London	1982.
 8	 M.	Bilewicz,	M.	Jaworska,	“Reconciliation	through	the	Right-
eous:	The	Narratives	of	Heroic	Helpers	As	a	Fulfillment	of	Emotional	
Needs	in	Polish-Jewish	Intergroup	Contact”,	Journal of Social Issues 
2013,	vol. 69,	pp.	162–179.
 9	 J.R.	Volhardt,	L.B.	Mazur,	M.	Lemahieu,	“Acknowledgment	after	
Mass	Violence:	Effects	on	Psychological	Well-being	and	Intergroup	
Relations”,	Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 2014, vol.	17,	
no.	3,	pp.	306–323.
10 Ibidem.
11	 Ibidem,	p.	318.
12	 T.S.	Abler,	“Scalping,	Torture,	Cannibalism	and	Rape:	An	Eth-
nohistorical	Analysis	of	Conflicting	Cultural	Values	in	War”,	Anthro-
pologica (New Series)	1992,	vol.	1,	pp.	3–20.
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Beevor13,	and	Lalumière,	Harris,	Quinsey	and	Rice14 show 
it.	Conflicts	between	grand	narratives	that	refer	to	the	his-
tory and identity of collective actors (communities, ethnic 
entities, nations, etc.) seems to be the most resilient espe-
cially if they are marked by tragic events, such as massa-
cres and genocides. It is assumed, from the perspective of the 
present approach, that such narratives imply cognitive dis-
sonance and social cognitive conflicts that are not limited 
to the individual or dyadic relations but are lived within 
large community and across the relations between commu-
nities. There is still a huge area of genocides that remains 
almost uncharted by theoretical and empirical research car-
ried in social psychology despite the fact that there is a huge 
evidence provided by archival, historical, sociological, per-
sonal narratives inquiries that deal with the communist 
crimes	against	humanity	that	have	some	110	million	killed	
victims (as Applebaum15,	Bacu16,	Chang	and	Halliday17,	Con-
quest18	et	al.,	Constante19,	Courtois	et	al.20, Ierunca21 and 
many others show. It remains a moral and epistemic puzzle 
why the de-humanizing technique designed by Makarenko22 
13	 A.	Beevor,	The fall of Berlin 1945,	Penguin,	London	2002.
14	 M.L.	Lalumière,	G.T.	Harris,	V.L.	Quinsey,	M.E.	Rice,	The Caus-
es of Rape: Understanding Individual Differences in the Male Pro-
pensity for Sexual Aggression, American Psychological Association, 
Washington,	DC	2005.
15 A. Applebaum, Gulag: A History, Doubleday,	New	York	2003.
16	 D.	Bacu,	The Anti-humans: The Student Re-education in Roma-
nian Prisons,	Soldiers	of	the	Cross,	Englewood,	CO	1971.
17	 J.	Chang, J. Halliday, J. Mao, The Unknown Story,	Knopf,	New	
York	2005.
18	 R.	Conquest,	The Great Terror: A Reassessment,	Oxford	Univer-
sity	Press,	Oxford	1990;	R.	Conquest,	Reflections on a Ravaged Cen-
tury, W.	W.	Norton,	New	York	2000.
19	 L.	Constante, L’Evasion silancieuse,	La	Découverte,	Paris	1990.
20	 S.	Courtois,	N.	Werth,	J.-J.	Panne,	K.	Paczkowski,	H.	Bartosek,	
J.L.	Margolin,	The Black Book of communism: Crimes, Terror, Repres-
sion,	trans.	by	J.	Murphy,	M.	Kramer,	Harvard	University	Press,	Har-
vard	1999.
21 V. Ierunca, Fenomenul Piteşti (The Piteşti phenomenon), Human-
itas,	Bucureşti	1990.
22 A.S. Makarenko, The Road to Life. An Epic in Education, transl. 
with	an	introduction	by	P.	Lichtenberg,	Oriole	Editions,	New	York	
1929/1973.
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under Stalin’s regime and called “communist re-educa-
tion”	that	aimed	to	change	the	identity	of	victim	through	
a repeated alternation of suffering an revenge remains 
almost unknown (unmentioned) by the main-stream social 
psychological studies focused on violence, obedience, crimes 
against humanity23).
We consider reasonable to assume that conflicting nar-
ratives, attitudes, and representations of tragic events such 
as massacres, crimes against humanity and genocides pose 
high cognitive, political and moral challenges especial-
ly to those who have been involved in such conflicts and 
played	opposite	roles	–	the	most	distant	and	significant	
roles being those of victims and perpetrators. First, there 
is a cognitive challenge when one side might be in denial 
and the other side makes attempts for public recognition. 
Series of landmark psychological concepts and measures 
have been developed in order to assess the strength of what 
has	been	called	“the	need	to	know”,	i.e.	“the	tendency	for	an	
individual	to	engage	in	and	enjoy	thinking”.24 Taking into 
account	previous	studies	carried	out	by	Cohen,	Stotland,	
&	Wolfe25 who defined “the need for cognition to structure 
relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways. It is 
a need to understand and make reasonable the experien-
tial	world”.26	Cacioppo	&	Petty	worked	out	a	reliable	and	
valid Need for Cognition Scale. In addition, their studies 
on	central	and	peripheral	routes	to	persuasion	(1979,	1981)	
strongly suggested that in the situation in which individ-
uals	are	“personally	involved”	with	the	issue	under	con-
sideration the rational processing of the information will 
23	 C.	Mamali,	“Interpersonal	Relationships	in	Totalitarian	Coci-
eties”,	in:	W.B.	Gudykunst,	S.	Stella	Ting-Toomey,	T.	Nishida	(eds), 
Communication in Personal Relationships across Cultures, Sage, 
Thousand	Oaks,	London–New	Delhi	1996;	C.	Mamali,	The Gandhian 
Mode of Becoming, Gujarat	Vidyapith,	Ahmedabad	1998;	C.	Mamali,	
“Lessons	from	the	Epistemic,	Moral	and	Social	Richness	of	Stanford	
Prison	Experiment”,	Dialogue 2004, vol.	19,	no.	1,	Spring,	pp.	22–24.
24	 J.T.	Cacioppo,	R.I.	Petty,	“The	Need	for	Cognition”,	Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 1982,	42(1),	p.	116.
25	 A.R.	Cohen,	E.	Stotland,	D.M.	Wolfe,	“An	Experimental	Inves-
tigation	of	Need	for	Cognition”,	Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-
chology 1955, SI, p. 291.
26 Ibidem.
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prevail.	Cacioppo	and	Petty	consider	that	this	process	could	
be influenced also by a “dispositional determinant of which 
route will be followed may be the extent to which recipients 
are motivated by their need for cognition to think about 
issues	that	they	confront”	(p.	130,	italics	in	original).	Stud-
ies focused on individual’s efforts to cope with tensions cre-
ated by ambiguity and disorder, for instance identified “the 
need	for	cognitive	closure”	understood	as	a	desire	for	“an	
answer	on	a	given	topic,	any	answer…	compared	to	confu-
sion	and	ambiguity”.27 In the case of the need for cognitive 
closure the starting point is seems to be a situation that 
represents by its cognitive features (unpredictability, con-
fusion and so on) a challenge that must be solved by the 
individual who faces it. Studies on the need for cognitive 
closure suggest that it has significant motivational conse-
quences that are measurable in a valid and reliable mode.28 
Studies	on	“belief	in	evil”29) suggest that the need for cogni-
tive closure predicts belief in evil and especially that “belief 
in evil in people and groups consistently predicted greater 
support for violent policies and lesser support for non-vio-
lent	policies”.30
The significant theoretical and empirical advances in the 
study of genocides and the causes and long-term conse-
quences of violence have a tremendous practical and polit-
ical value. At the same time it becomes more and more 
necessary to include the perspective of the insiders, and 
especially of those who had a landmark contribution in the 
design and experiential application of non-violent approach-
es to lethal conflicts as it is the paradigmatic case of Gan-
dhi. His contribution seems to be neglected by nowadays 
27	 A.W.	Kruglanski,	Motivations for Judging and Knowing: Impli-
cations or Causal Attributions,	in:	E.T.	Higgins,	R.M.	Sorrentino	(eds),	
The Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social 
Behavior,	vol.	2,	Guilford	Press,	New	York	1990,	p.	337.
28	 A.	Roets,	A.	Van	Hiel,	“Separating	Ability	from	Need:	Clarifying	
the	Dimensional	Structure	of	the	Need	for	Closure	Scale”, Personal-
ity and Social Psychology Bulletin 2007,	vol.	33,	pp.	266–280.
29	 M.	Campbell,	J.R.	Volhardt,	“Fighting	the	Good	Fight:	The	
Relationship	between	Belief	in	Evil	and	Support	for	Violent	Poli-
cies”,	Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 2013,	vol. 40,	no.	1,	
pp.	16–33.
30	 Ibidem,	p.	30.
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social psychology while, in contrast, conceptions that pro-
moted the use of violent means, such as that present-
ed in The Prince, which also inspired crucial research on 
manipulation and violent behavior as is the Mach Scale and 
its theoretical basis31, receive by far a greater epistemic an 
political attention.32
Taking into account that the healing process at individu-
al level of traumatic events depends on working out a com-
prehensive narrative that provides closure, as Harvey’s 
research suggests, it makes sense to ask what might be the 
features of the need for cognition and the need for closure 
in the case of macro-social ambiguous and confusing sit-
uations while various collective actors are predominantly 
attached to conflicting narratives about the features, caus-
es and consequences of tragic historical events that ended 
up with many victims. Also, these approaches, including 
the scales worked out to measure the need for cognition 
and	the	need	for	closure	invite	a	question:	what	does	hap-
pen with the interrogative (questioning) potential of indi-
vidual and collective actors while they face cognitively, 
politically and morally dilemmatic situations that have 
existential importance, such as conflicts on assessing gen-
ocide?	None	of	the	scales	include	items	regarding	the	ten-
dency of asking questions and counter questions. Previous 
studies suggest that the interrogative potential is strong-
ly associated with the strength and force of motivational 
vectors.33 Questioning and counter-questioning are cogni-
tive processes that at the same time could be loaded with 
power related features, especially in the case of societal 
dialogue or dispute.
Issues such as genocides are of the highest existential 
interests for individual and collective actors. In many such 
cases the need for cognition and the demands for recogni-
tion and reparations by all the involved have been, at least 
31	 R.	Christie,	F.L.	Geiss,	Studies in Machiavellianism, Academic 
Press,	New	York	1970.
32	 C.	Mamali,	The Gandhian Mode…
33	 Compare	C.	Mamali,	“The	Oracle-Sphinx	Model:	The	Devel-
opment	of	Questioning	and	Answering	Abilities”, Internation-
al Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences	2010,	vol.	5,	no.	3,	
pp.	247–272.
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in a minimal degree, satisfied. However, there are still such 
conflicts marked by contradictory representations that are 
powerful challenges for the need of cognition. In such situa-
tions knowing essential facts about a given tragic reality by 
one side is not sufficient to satisfy the need for cognition if 
the other side has opposite representations. Questions about 
the causes of denial, of possible errors, of bad will and so on 
could feed the need for reaching a decisive knowledge and 
intersubjective agreement among collective actors.
Research inspired by Piagetian conception shows that 
the individual cognitive development can be enhanced by 
a special type of conflict that is at the same time social 
and cognitive and it has been called social-cognitive con-
flict	“socio-cognitive	conflict”.34 Taking into account Hin-
de’s	model	of	levels	of	social	complexity	(1987;	1997)	from	
individual, group, communal, up to the cultural level the 
conflicting representations on massacres and genocides 
pose a series of unexplored questions. What are the fea-
tures of this socio-cognitive conflict that involves collec-
tive	social	actors	including	their	official	representatives?	
Are the conflicting narratives about genocide a specific 
form	of	“cognitive	dissonance”	(as	defined	by	Festinger)	
but	developed	at	macro-social	level?	At	the	individual	lev-
el, as predicted by Festinger’s theory, the tension gener-
ated by the cognitive dissonance motivates the individual 
to reduce it. According to Festinger35, dissonance is pro-
duced	between	different	“knowledges”	of	the	same	reality.	
These knowledges are called elements of dissonance. The 
theory	posits	that:	“the	reality	which	impinges	on	a	per-
son will exert pressures in the direction of bringing the 
appropriate cognitive elements into correspondence with 
reality”.36	Crimes	against	humanity	and	genocides	that	are	
represented in distorted modes or even denied by one part 
(usually the perpetrating one) are, according to the present 
approach, able to nurture powerful cognitive dissonance 
34	 A.-N.	Perret-Clermont,	Social Interaction and Cognitive Devel-
opment in Children,	Academic	Press,	London	1980.
35	 L.	Festinger,	A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,	Row	&	Peter-
son,	Evanston,	IL	1957,	pp.	9–10.
36	 Ibidem,	p.	11.
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within and between representations of collective actors on 
such	events.	By	the	mere	social	complexity	this	cognitive	
dissonance	implies	not	only	different	“knowledges”	but	also	
opposite vital interests of the communities and strategies 
to cover, deceive or to reveal the facts. What might be the 
motivational consequences of a cognitive dissonance gen-
erated in relation with macro-social events for the individ-
ual	and	collective	actors	involved	in	the	conflict?	It	seems	
reasonable	to	assume	that	the	“socio-cognitive	conflict”	and	
cognitive dissonance related to such events and their rep-
resentations do not engage only individuals but also col-
lective social actors, ethnic groups, social categories and 
nations. As such these conflicts have a political and moral 
nature that mark not only the past, present and future rela-
tions between sides of the conflict but their identities too. 
We assume that the exploration of basic knowledge of vio-
lent events and of the potential questions generated by their 
conflicting representations, claims or denial are necessary 
steps for the unresolved disputes.
The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that “If two 
elements are dissonant with one another, the magnitude 
of dissonance will be a function of the importance of the 
elements”.37 If we look from this perspective to the disso-
nance created by opposite views (denial versus affirmation) 
on a historical event that has the magnitude of genocide it fol-
lows that such a macro-societal dissonance will be extremely 
powerful and will tend to exist till it is solved in an accurate 
and just mode. In contrast to the cognitive dissonance lived 
at individual level the macro-societal cognitive dissonance is 
marked	by	at	least	the	following	features:	(1)	there	are	con-
flicting public, even official narratives (claims) on the same 
facts, situations, events that are obviously affecting many 
people and groups who might be more inclined to accept one 
of	the	explanations;	(2)	the	prevailing	narrative	(explana-
tion) that solves the cognitive conflict has direct consequenc-
es on the economic, social, moral or combined state of each 
group; (3) the formal acceptance of a solution to the existing 
macro-societal cognitive dissonance becomes the new ground 
for the relations between the social sides of the conflict. 
37	 Ibidem,	p.	16.
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The long-term maintenance of denial in spite of the strong 
cognitive dissonance implied by it might be supported by an 
increased process of moral disengagement as it is defined by 
Bandura’s38 model.
The opposite accounts of mega-tragedies generate a com-
plex social-moral-political and cognitive conflict that engages 
large collective actors with tremendous social energies and 
resources. If the need for consonance, as it is assumed by the 
theory	of	“consonantiste	psychology”39 is a natural tendency 
for individuals, then it is reasonable to inquire if there is also 
a tendency to achieve consonance within and across-societies 
that have opposite accounts for the same tragic event. The 
dissonance between opposite accounts that different commu-
nities have on the same mega-tragedy that is in great part 
known to these communities might generate powerful mac-
ro-fields motivational forces that aim to solve this conflict. 
This is a macro-social (inter-nations) dissonance that implies 
cognitive, political and moral components with huge prac-
tical consequences. The motivational forces implied in this 
societal dissonance will be greater and more resilient as the 
opposite accounts are more relevant for the cultural identi-
ties of the two sides.
The present study considers this problem and assumes 
that a first step to approach it is exploring the accuracy 
of basic historical knowledge on such events and the ques-
tions invited by the events and by the ways in which all the 
engaged sides have coped and are coping with these events. 
The study considers that the uncovering and using the 
interrogative potential that might be associated with such 
unsolved conflicts has at the same time epistemic, political, 
moral and practical functions. Inconvenient questions, i.e., 
genuine and cognitively justified questions, on open macro-
social wounds would not be an easy task due to many forms 
of	repression,	as	Billig40 uses this Freudian concept. The 
repression of the questioning potential of common people 
38	 A.	Bandura,	Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm and 
Live with Themselves,	Worth	Publishers,	MacMillan	Learning,	New	
York	2006.
39	 Odobleja,	1938.
40	M.	Billig,	Freudian Repression: Conversation Creating the 
Unconscious,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge	1999.
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and especially of the dominated social categories41 is charac-
teristic to dictatorial practices, regimes and mentalities. The 
repression of interrogative orientation that targets tragic 
historical events can happen even within modern democratic 
societies when questioning confronts the official representa-
tions on the same events. Previous studies used the tech-
nique of self-inquiry to uncover unused, possibly repressed, 
questioning potential in Romania, in working places and 
on political attitudes in the research on values on politi-
cal attitudes.42 It has been noticed that in communist soci-
eties	(Romania,	1945–1989)	the	questioning	potential	has	
been strongly repressed even in relation with non-political 
issues,	as	work	relations.	Even	in	a	well-established	dem-
ocratic society, as the USA, the inquiring potential of com-
mon persons remains dormant on explicit political issues as 
it is proved by a great number of critical questions gener-
ated	toward	Obama’s	administration	in	the	cross-cultural	
study	on	values	and	political	attitudes.	Obviously,	the	dem-
ocratic culture made possible such an investigation of the 
inquiring potential related to core political themes while 
such a study would have been unthinkable under the Roma-
nian communist regime. The present research assumes that 
the presentation to common persons of the historic events 
of	1915	(including	the	official	version	of	the	Turkish	gov-
ernment which treats it as a tragedy and denies that it has 
been genocide and the Armenian perspective that consid-
ers it as genocide) and asking them to generate questions 
will	be	associated	with	a	“moral	shock”.43 The moral shock 
41	 J.	Sidanius,	J.	Liu,	J.	Shaw,	F.	Pratto,	“Social	Dominance	Orien-
tation,	Hierarchy-attenuators	and	Hierarchy	Enhancers:	Social	Dom-
inance	Theory	and	the	Criminal	Justice	System”,	Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology 1994,	vol.	24,	pp.	338–366.
42	 S.H.	Schwartz,	G.V.	Caprara,	M.	Vecchione	et	al.,	“Basic	Per-
sonal	Values	Underlie	and	Give	Coherence	to	Political	Values:	
A	Cross-national	Study	in	15	Countries”,	Political Behaviour 2013;	
also	M.	Vecchione,	S.H.	Schwartz,	S.H.	Caprara	et	al.,	“Personal	Val-
ues	and	Political	Activism:	A	Cross-National	Study”,	British Jour-
nal of Psychology	2014,	vol.	2,	no.	6.
43 See J.M. Jasper, The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, 
and Creativity in Social Movements,	University	of	Chicago	Press,	
Chicago,	IL	1997;	J.M.	Jasper,	J.	Poulsen,	“Recruiting	Strangers	
and	Friends:	Moral	Shocks	and	Social	Networks	in	Animal	Rights	
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could be triggered in this case by the participants’ self-dis-
covery of their ignorance, by their bewilderment in relation 
with the silence of the major sources of information about 
these tragic events, and by the existence of the two conflict-
ing narratives, one asserting and one denying the genocide. 
It	is	well	known	that	up	to	2017	there	are	only	28	countries	
that	officially	recognized	the	1915	events	as	genocide,	which	
places the question into a global perspective.
After an overview of the studies on the genocide suffered 
by the Armenians in close connection to the concept of gen-
ocide,	based	on	Lemkin’s	work,	as	defined	and	used	by	UN,	
the study will present its theoretical framework, assump-
tions, methods and findings. This research belongs to a larg-
er project on Armenian genocide and its long-term historical 
consequences.44	On	the	empirical	side	the	project	includes	pre 
and post 100 years commemoration of the genocide surveys 
carried out on convenience samples in seven countries, on 
two	national	representative	samples	in	one	country	(in	2015	
and	2016),	on qualitative research on convenience samples 
through the technique of directed self-inquiry45 in three coun-
tries applied in face-to-face sessions as well by the appli-
cation of the technique of directed-self inquiry through the 
Facebook. The use of self-inquiry technique is justified by 
the fact that the conflict between the official denial of the 
genocide by the representatives of the Turkish side and 
the recognition of the genocide by the Armenian official rep-
resentatives	and	by	a	series	of	governments	(over	20).	It	is	
assumed that the split of representations and attitudes on 
1915 genocide	(i.e.,	29	countries	officially	recognized	it	while	
Turkey denies it) is a source of social, political and cogni-
tive dissonance at macro-social and global level that gen-
erate questions in the minds of many people questions that 
are still unexplored area. Within the cultural contexts of the 
countries that deny the genocide or do not express any offi-
cial	position	it	is	expected	that	questions	on	the	1915	events	
and	Anti-nuclear	Protests”, Social Problems 1995, vol.	42,	pp.	493–512.	
DOI:	10.2307/3097043.
44	 C.	Mamali,	“Accuracy	of	Basic	Knowledge	of	Traumatic	Histor-
ical	Events:	The	Armenian	Genocide”,	Journal of Loss and Trauma 
2017,	vol. 22, no.	2,	pp.	99–109.	DOI:	10.1080/15325024.2016.1187937.
45	 C.	Mamali,	“Democratization	of	the	Social	Research	Process”.
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might be repressed. Stimulating the interrogative potential, 
as it has been observed in other studies, is a way to overcome 
such repressive forces.
During	history	humans	have	committed	extended	atroc-
ities over other humans. Many of these atrocities, since 
ancient till modern and contemporary times46 are well 
documented and entered in the public discourse of many 
societies, especially within the historical consciousness 
of democratic societies through research, history books, 
public sources of information, arts, educational institu-
tions and political culture. World history has its own skel-
etons closet that poses a great puzzle not just due to its 
size and atrocity but to the possible long term-consequences 
of denial and of open macro-wounds. This is so because what 
some groups tend to cover or to keep silent other groups 
struggle to make public. What are the causes and also the 
psychological, political, cultural and moral consequences 
on the collective and individual social actors, victims and 
perpetrators of the denial of such events and of contradic-
tory	narratives?	Do	the	resilient	attempts	of	a	victimized	
group that searches for official recognition and apologies 
for its collective suffering become a social movement even 
if	such	efforts	involve	many	generations?	As	suggested	pre-
viously47, the accuracy of historical knowledge and its soci-
etal transparency are necessary means to cope with old 
macro-social traumas, such as genocide especially if such 
tragic events happened long time before the concept of gen-
ocide has been developed. The present study explores fur-
ther the issue of the accuracy of basic historical knowledge 
on	the	genocide	suffered	by	the	Armenians	in	the	Ottoman	
Empire	by	adding	the	findings	of	a	new	national	represent-
ative sample that has been surveyed at one year after the 
100	years	commemoration	of	the	1915	genocide.	In	addition	
46	 T.S.	Abler,	“Scalping,	Torture,	Cannibalism	and	Rape…”;	A.	Bee-
vore, The fall…;	R.	Bilali,	“National	Narrative	and	Social	Psycholog-
ical	Influences	in	Turks’	Denial	of	the	Mass	Killings	of	Armenians	
as	Genocide”,	Journal of Social Issues 2013,	vol.	69,	no.	1,	pp.	16–33;	
M.L.	Lalumière,	G.T.	Harris,	V.L.	Quinsey,	M.E.	Rice,	The Causes 
of Rape…
47	 C.	Mamali,	“Accuracy	of	Basic	Knowledge	of	Traumatic	Histor-
ical…”,	pp.	99–109.	DOI:	10.1080/15325024.2016.1187937.
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to this the paper includes a study focused on the interrog-
ative potential of the participants by using the self-inquir-
ing technique. The self-inquiry opens to the participants the 
possibility to generate and direct questions to various tar-
gets from impersonal level, i.e., only the issue is mentioned, 
to	various	social	actors	and	explicitly	toward	one’s	self.	Dur-
ing a discussion with a small group of students after a social 
psychology	class	at	the	beginning	of	90’s	in	Iowa,	USA	it	
became evident that students had a genuine interest to learn 
more about the violence of authoritarian regimes and per-
sonalities. At the same time none of them had any knowl-
edge	about	the	“Armenian	question”,	in	fact	genocide.	This	
observation determined one of the authors to resort later 
on	to	the	technique	of	self-inquiry.	Later	the	lack	of	basic	
knowledge about these events became more evident through 
the use of a non-directive technique (self-inquiry) that asks 
participants to generate questions. The questions generat-
ed by the participants point out that the events are large-
ly	unknown:	“Does any person know anything about this?” 
(Female, 22 years, white, 14 years of education); “I have no 
knowledge about this event” (Male, 23 years, black, 14 years 
of education); “Who are the Armenians?” (Female, 19 years, 
white, high school); “I don’t believe our generation knows 
much about these events. I consider myself fairly educated 
and yet I know near to nothing about the Turk-Armenian 
conflicts.” (Male, 25, white, 15 years of education).
The study explores the accuracy of basic knowledge about 
the	1915	tragic	historical	events	(victims	and	perpetrators,	
and	size	of	the	atrocities)	prior	and	after	the	100	years	com-
memoration	(April	24th	2015)	and	the	questioning	orien-
tation	that	is	stimulated	by	1915	genocide.	The	research	
designed to last a few years to explore possible chang-
es in time on national representative samples and on con-
venience	samples	from	different	cultural	settings.	Because	
different countries have different ways to refer to the vio-
lent	events	of	1915	–	from	denial,	official	silence,	assessing	
them as terrible massacres up to national and legal recog-
nition of these events as genocide48	–	the	access	to	national	
48 A. Alayarian, Consequences of Denial: The Armenian Geno-
cide,	Karnac,	London	2008;	H.	Bozarslan,	V.	Dulcert,	R.	Kévorkian,	
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representative samples across the entire spectrum of these 
representations is necessary, but, unfortunately, problem-
atic now. At the same time there are some social events that 
have a relevant epistemic potential as it is, for instance, the 
commemoration	of	100	years	of	genocide	(marking	a	limit	
prior and after a landmark public commemoration within 
a time of global communication) as well as critical interna-
tional events that engage the old collective actors and might 
function as reminders of open collective wounds.
The	accuracy	of	basic	historical	knowledge	on	1915	gen-
ocide suffered by the Armenians is approached by tak-
ing into consideration the degree of subjective confidence 
in one’s own knowledge about the events. Studies on “atti-
tude certainty”49 consider that the subjective sense of confi-
dence one has on one’s attitudes is an important component 
of the attitude itself. The present approach that considers 
that accurate, false and speculative knowledge could be 
important ingredients of attitudes assumes that the cer-
tainty (confidence) in one’s knowledge about any event, and 
especially on events that receive contradictory accounts 
from the behalf of various social actors might have impor-
tant cognitive, moral and behavioral consequences. This 
hypothesis is in tune with the findings of a study on the 
relationship	between	“attitude	certainty”	and	“attitudinal	
advocacy”50	that	show	that	it	has	a	“J-shaped”	curve,	i.e.,	
advocacy intentions and behaviors peak high under high 
attitudinal certainty.51 We expect that those who have accu-
rate historical knowledge about the 1915 genocide and at the 
same time have a high certainty of their knowledge (in this 
study	one’s	knowledge	certainty	about	1915	events	has	been	
assessed	through	a	6-point	scale	from	almost	100%	sure	
Comprendre le génocide des Arméniens, Éditions Tallandier, Paris 
2015;	Power	2002.
49	 D.D.	Rucker,	Z.L.	Tormala,	R.E.	Petty,	P.	Briñol,	“Consumer	
Conviction	and	Commitment:	An	Appraisal	Based	Framework	for	
Attitude	Certainty”,	Journal of Consumer Psychology	2014,	vol.	24,	
no.	1,	pp.	119–136.
50	 L.B.	Cheatham,	Z.L.	Tormala,	“The	Curvilinear	Relationship	
between	Attitude	Certainty	and	Attitudinal	Advocacy”, Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 2017,	vol.	43,	no.	1,	pp.	3–16.
51	 Ibidem,	s.	14.
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to	almost	0%	sure)	will become active disseminators of this 
knowledge.
The	next	sections	will	approach:	(I)	The	concept	of	gen-
ocide, its theoretical developments, and applications to the 
Armenian genocide; (II) Historical, cultural, sociological, 
psychological and political sources and studies focused on 
the	1915	(some	years	before	and	after)	atrocities	against	
Armenians	within	the	Ottoman	Empire;	(III)	Findings	
of a research carried out before and after the one hundred 
year commemoration of the genocide.
Conceptual frame of genocide
The genocidal reality has a long historical precedence in rela-
tion to the concept of genocide. Since the concept has been 
coined the attitudes and perceptive toward genocides changed. 
The definition of genocide, as it is has been adopted by the 
Genocide	Convention	of	United	Nations	in	December	9	–	1948,	
comes after world history faced mass atrocities that targeted 
large groups of people based on ethnicity, race, religion, polit-
ical and class membership. Some ten years before the WWII 
Holocaust52,	Lemkin	who	introduced	the	concept	of	genocide	
relating it to moral judgment, attempted to approach the issue 
looking	specifically	in	1933	to	the	crimes	against	Armeni-
an	people.	Lemkin’s	work	remains	essential	for	21st century 
while it started, as Power53 strongly suggests, with the Arme-
nian	genocide	and	includes	the	trials	from	Constantinopole	
and	Berlin.	It	is	a	historical	fact	that	after	the	trials	failed	
to lead to an international recognition of the crimes against 
humanity some survivors of the genocide did resort to vio-
let acts. This is the case with the young Armenian survivor 
Soghomon	Tehlirian	who	killed	in	1921	Talât	–	one	of	those	
responsible for the genocide. Power reveals that this violent 
reaction	prompted	Lemkin	to	ask	an	essential	question	that	
52	 R.	Lemkin,	Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, 
Analysis of Government, Proposal for Redress,	Carnegie	Endowment	
for	International	Peace,	Division	of	International	Law,	Washington,	
DC	1944.
53 S. Power, ‘A Problem from Hell’. America and the Age of Geno-
cide,	Basic	Books,	New	York	2007,	pp.	2–3,	17–22.
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points out a macro-social cognitive dissonance and the abuse 
of	double	standards.	As	reproduced	in	Power’s	study	Lem-
kin	asked:	“It is a crime for Tehlirian to kill a man but it is 
not a crime for his oppressor to kill more than a million men? 
This is most inconsistent.” 54 This critical moment is partially 
the outcome of a painful dissonance lived by one person, the 
killer, who, on one side knew the denial discourse of the Turk-
ish officials and on the other side he knew also information 
on the Armenian genocide. This critical moment, probably, 
played a significant role in the growth of cognitive dissonance 
at the level of the public discourse that deserves to be stud-
ied. The event is at the same time part of a sequences of post-
genocidal events that enhanced the emergence of a long-term 
social movement that has manifest and latent sides, non-vio-
lent and violent sides aiming to the recognition of genocide. 
Its violent side has been mainly rooted in the denial practic-
es. Lemkin’s question (as a legal expert) has been triggered by 
an obvious macro-societal cognitive dissonance and targets the 
moral and cognitive inconsistency of societal perspectives on 
1915 events. Lemkin’s question invites the question: does this 
MSCD stimulates questions on 1915 events and similar events 
in the minds of lay persons on the moral and cognitive incon-
sistency of societal perspectives?
Genocide is an infernal reality that is prior to its concept, 
which did become a cognitive, moral and political impera-
tive in order to punish, discourage and prevent it. The con-
vention	of	UN	(1948)	defines	genocide:	“genocide, whether 
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime 
under international law which they undertake to prevent and 
to punish” (Article 1). It identifies as genocidal: “acts com-
mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a nation-
al, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing 
members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or men-
tal harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing meas-
ures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group” (Arti-
cle	2	U.N.G.A.,	1948).
54	 Ibidem,	p.	17.
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Chirot	and	Karell55 achieved a constructive critical 
approach to this definition. Their criticism refers, among 
other	issues,	to:	the	ambiguity	of	the	expression	“in	whole	
or	in	part”	because	it	can	mean	anything	ranging	from	the	
Holocaust	to	minor	episodes	of	killing”;	a	policy	is	considered	
genocidal if it is intentional and premeditated. This “can be 
done	in	a	case	like	Armenian	genocide	by	Ottoman	author-
ities	in	1915,	the	Holocaust	[…]	but	it	is	harder	to	dem-
onstrate if there was no actual plan to kill all members 
of	a	particular	group”.56	Chirot	and	Karell	argue	that	the	
definition leaves out any attempts “to destroy a group on 
political	or	economic	grounds”.57 Galtung58 worked out a tax-
onomy	that	has	as	its	peak	“omnicide”,	which	includes	gen-
ocide,	and	is	considered	as	“sumum	malum.”
The indicators of genocide should be followed on long-
historical scale, because some acts might not be immedi-
ately lethal for a group or most of its members and their 
group identity but during long historical periods through 
the cumulative long-term effects that force a population 
to diminish dramatically or vanish after some generations 
and/or	to	be	stripped	off	its	linguistic	and	cultural	identi-
ty, i.e., to dis-identify from its origin and become part of the 
perpetrator’s	identity.	In	the	history	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	
this is related to the practice of janissary:	by	the	same	token	
the dominated group loses social, military and reproductive 
energy that goes into the social reservoir of the invading 
group. This might belong, in certain cases, to a long-term 
genocidal pattern. Mehmed II demands to Vlad Ţepeş – 
Dracula to pay the tribute of 10 000 “galbeni” (gold) and 
to “bring 500 boys”.	Dracula	paid	the	financial	tribute	but	
refused	to	give	the	boys	as	recorded	by	the	Byzantin	histori-
an	Ducas59	(1461–1462).	The	“boys”	had	to	become	Sultan’s	
55	 D.	Chirot,	D.	Karell,	“Identity	Construction	and	the	Causes	
of	Genocidal	Mass	Murder”, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 
2014,	vol.	14,	no.	3,	pp.	484–499.
56	 Ibidem,	pp.	486–487.
57	 Ibidem,	p.	486.
58 J. Galtung, A Theory of Peace: Building Direct-structural-cul-
tural Peace,	Transcend	International,	2016.
59	 See	M.	Berza,	“Haraciul	Moldovei	şi	Ţării	Româneşti”,	Studii şi 
Materiale de Istorie Medie 1957,	vol.	11,	p.	27.
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soldiers:	this	represents	a	military adoption program that 
weakens the occupied country and strengthen the power 
of	the	invader.	The	tribute	(harâc)	had	long-term	devas-
tating financial and economic consequences60). The tribute 
in children has a distinct qualitative nature, which lasted, 
with	intermittences,	between	100	and	400	years	in	different	
Christian	kingdoms,	because	of	its	demographic	and	cultur-
al destruction. The imposed tribute in children is a geno-
cidal practice. These children, as future soldiers, have great 
chances to become killers against the population they orig-
inate from. The practice of tribute in children is implied by 
Article	1,e	(U.N.G.A.,	1948).
This violence might be covered by a linguistic alchemy 
that excludes the process from some landmark historical 
analyses and in some cases even the meaning of basic terms 
is changed. This is the case with the concept of janissary/
janizary (yeniçeri, Turkish) and the reality covered by it. 
First,	its	original	meaning:	the	term	janizary	means	“a sol-
dier of the old Turkish footguards (c.1330–1826) formed orig-
inally of renegade prisoners and of a tribute of Christian 
children”.61	The	same	definition	is	used	by	most	British,	
French, German, Greek, Italian, Romanian dictionaries. 
Kinross	refers	to	these	troops	that	were	assumed,	after	
a long and harsh training, to serve the Sultan, as “mili-
tary slavery”	that	“shocked	the	Christian	world.	But	it	was	
familiar enough to the Islamic world, and particularly to the 
Turks	themselves”.62
Prior to it there are dictionaries that do not deal with 
the historical and social processes that are implied in the 
genesis of janissary/janizary/yeniçeri, which have been 
described	only	as	guard	of	the	Turkish	King	(Sultan!!)	and	
as foot-guards. For instance, A Complete Dictionary for 
the English Language63)	define	it	as:	“One	of	the	guards	
of the Turkish king; one of the officers whose business it 
is	to	revise	and	correct	the	pope	bulls”.	A	dictionary	edited	
60	 B.	Murgescu,	România şi Europa. Acumularea decalajelor eco-
nomice (1500–2010).	Polirom,	Iaşi	2010,	pp.	32–34.
61 Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary,	Edinburgh	1977.
62	 Ibidem,	pp.	48–51.
63 T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary for the English Language, 
vol.	2,	Charles,	Dilly,	London	1797.
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by Noah Webster An American Dictionary of English Lan-
guage64	define	it	as:	“Janizary	[Turkish,	yeniskeri]:	A	soldier	
of	the	Turkish	foot-guards.	These	were	disbanded	in	1826”.	
However, later on sources up to relatively recent sources 
treat in a very different way the content of the term and the 
practice	of	janissary	and	embellish	it	as	“elite	soldiers”.	This	
is done by ignoring its meaning and especially by remain-
ing	silent	about	the	ethnic	and	religious	origin	of	“yeniçeri”	
corps and that they originate in the social practice of trib-
ute in children and forced assimilation.	Even	works	focused	
on	the	economic	and	social	aspects	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	
(1300–1914),	time	frame	that	includes	the	reign	of	Fatih	
Mehmed	II	whot	asked	Dracula	to	pay	a	tribute	of	500	boys,	
do not mention this social practice with deep economic, mil-
itary and demographic consequences. This is the case with 
otherwise	the	excellent	work	on	Ottoman	Empire	edited	
by	İnalcik	&	Quataert65:	the	work	is	silent	on	the	ques-
tion of tribute in children.	It	happens	also	with	a	very	Dic-
tionary,	to	all	its	editions	since	1987.	It	says,	janissary	
“1: a soldier of an elite corps of Turkish troops organized 
in 14th century and abolished I 1826 2: a member of a group 
of loyal or subservient useful	work	focused	on	the	‘Otto-
man	language”’	that	presents	the	terms	yeniçerilerden	and	
yeniçeri	without	revealing	the	origin	of	these	soldiers.66	On	
the other hand, there are studies that strongly suggest that 
various forms of collective violence against populations from 
Ottoman	Empire,	mainly	Armenians,	did	exist	since	long	
time as well as the practice of official denial.67 These prac-
tices	are	in	consonance	with	that	of	“slave	soldiers”.
The above linguistic issue becomes more puzzling if we 
look to the Merriam Webster troops, officials”. The Amer-
ican College Dictionary	since	1947	to	2000,	does	the	same	
64	 Harper	and	Brothers,	New	York	1847.
65	 H.	İnalcik,	D.	Quataert,	An Economic and Social History of the 
Ottoman Empire 1300–1914,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge	
1996.
66 V. Panaite, Limbajul ottoman al războiului şi păcii. Dicţionar de 
termeni şi expresii,	Editura	Universităţii	din	Bucureşti,	2014,	p.	181.
67	 F.	Gőçek	Müge,	Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective 
Violence Against the Armenians 1789–2009,	Oxford	University	Press,	
Oxford	2014.
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“A member of a group of elite, highly loyal supporters…”. The 
2012	edition	of	American Heritage Dictionary does not con-
tain this term. These definitions do not reflect the social 
practice	to	recruit	(from	whom?	by	what	means)	these	sol-
diers who were children born in the families of the occupied 
nations (kingdoms), which had a different mother language 
and	religion	(Christianity)	than	the	occupiers	being	forced	
into	a	new	identity.	Conceptually,	these	linguistics	short-
comings achieve an alchemical operation that turns a brutal 
procedure into an appreciative assessment of its outcome; 
this is called alchemical historical language. The alchem-
ical historical language is used as a tool to reduce cogni-
tive dissonance that might be contrary to the interests of the 
actors who have control over a form of public discourse, as 
that implied in universal linguistic tools such as diction-
aries. Because	alchemy	might	have	beyond	cognitive	and	
material goals also moral goals68 it is assumed that in some 
cases language is used politically for embellishing appall-
ing	practices	such	as	“military	slavery”	nurtured	by	forced	
adoption and assimilation of children of the occupied popu-
lation.	Are	such	practices	crimes	against	an	entire	group?	
The long-term historical context suggests that “Pax Otto-
manica” differs essentially from “Pax Romana” and had long 
term destructive effects.69
The forced assimilation of children and young women 
through abduction, rape, forced marriage, forced conver-
sion, mandatory learning of the oppressor’s language and 
unlearning the mother tongue belong to deep cultural prac-
tice	that	did	not	end	in	1826.	It	has	been	brutally	re-acti-
vated	during	1896–1923	against	Armenians	as	proved	by	
survivors’ testimonies70 and by historical study on abduction 
and its partial reversal.71 This practice damages the demo-
68	 Sivin,	1989,	p.	13.
69	 N.	Djuvara,	Civilizaţii şi tipare istorice	(French:	Civilisations et 
lois historiques. Essais d’étude comparée des civilisations), Humani-
tas, Bucureşti	2014,	p.	185.
70 V. Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewit-
ness Survivors,	Gitoutyoun	Publishing	House	of	NAS	RA,	Yerevan	
2011.
71	 L.	Ekmekçioğlu,	“A	Climate	for	Abduction,	a	Climate	for	
Redemption:	The	Politics	of	Inclusion	During	and	After	the	Armenian	
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graphic capital of a nation (ethnic group, community) and 
its biological (genetic too) and cultural potential.
The tribute in children that had to be paid alongside oth-
er tributes is related to the question of territorial rights. 
In other geopolitical conditions it did take the form of Impe-
rial	taxes	as	it	is	so	well	documented	for	the	American	Colo-
nies72,	but	again,	under	all	its	forms	the	“tribute”	is	supposed	
to be paid by a population that is settled and uses a defined 
territory. There are numerous historical situations when 
the invaders occupied the territories of the previous inhab-
itants, it means of those who, in most cases, have been the 
first historical settlers of the respective territories. The ter-
ritory, the language, religion and common traditions are 
basic dimensions of cultural identity even when some pop-
ulations are located in places that are very distant among 
themselves. Any collective cultural identity exists within 
space and time. Space and time might be continuous or dis-
crete realities for cultural identity but they cannot be elim-
inated.	The	concept	of	“historical	right”	cannot	be	reduced	
just to a territorial area (including waters, and underground 
resources) as it sometimes happens with its definition within 
the political theory.73 We have to take into account that the 
political features of the territory have old evolutionary roots 
and	long	trajectories	that	include	“nests”,	“vatră” (Roma-
nian	word	that	has	the	meaning	of	“abode”	and	a	place	for	
preparing hot food, representing the core of one’s own home 
and	community	as	in	“vatra	satului”/village	vatra),”homes”,	
“niches”,”	ecosystems”74, national states, empires, transna-
tional systems which, all have a spatial-temporal structure 
and are essential for the survival and development of its 
occupiers from the first ones to the most recent, including 
Genocide”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2013,	vol.	55,	
no.	3,	pp.	522–553.
72	 B.	Franklin,	Writings,	Boston–London	1722–1726;	idem,	Poor 
Richard’s Almanack,	1733–1758;	idem,	The Autobiography, The 
Library	of	America,	New	York	1987.
73	 C.	Gans,	“Historical	Rights:	The	Evaluation	of	Nationalist	
Claims	to	Sovereignty”,	Political Theory	2001,	vol.	29,	pp.	58–79.
74	 I.	Eibl-Eibesfeldt,	“Interactionism,	Content,	and	Language	
in	Human	Ethology	Studies”,	Behav. Brain Sci.	1982,	vol.	5,	
pp.	273–274.
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co-habitation,	cross-mating,	rejection,	exclusion	and/or	dec-
imation. For humans this spatial-temporal structure is the 
locus of producing, reproducing and growing various forms 
of	capital	(economic,	cultural,	social	symbolic	–	as	defined	by	
Bourdieu.75 Humans are aware of the fate of former popula-
tions, first occupiers of various spaces (territories) for a cer-
tain period, who vanished biologically, culturally or both. 
The genocide against the first occupiers of a territory poses 
an	unsettling	existential	puzzle:	if	social	actors	(individuals,	
groups, tribes, nations, states) cannot be safe within the spa-
tial and temporal limits of the territory occupied and, many 
times, constructively changed by their work, uncertainty 
of one’s own existence and relations will increase and will 
feed the collective existential anxiety. What might be safe on 
this earth for an individual or collective actor if one’s original 
“vatra” is not safe? The genocide of the first, or previous long-
term settlers of a given spatial-temporal structure that has 
also specific cultural features (language, religion, traditions) 
that might be different from those of the perpetrators has 
a nihilistic uprooting character. In the case of Armenians 
who	lived	under	the	rule	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	the	ques-
tion of territory, of land ownership and real estate is rele-
vant	since	at	least	1863	when	conflicts	between	the	Empire’s	
administration	on	one	side	and	Armenians	an	Kurds	on	the	
other side are well documented.76
The roles of victims and perpetrators, and the rights 
and duties after mass atrocities form a problem of high 
“complexity”.77	Based	on	historical	evidence	it	seems	that	the	
dynamics of this complexity becomes more unpredictable due 
to	a	series	of	factors	such	as:	acknowledgment	versus	deni-
al by perpetrators and other collective actors (governments 
75	 P.	Bourdieu,	“Cultural	Reproduction	and	Social	Reproduction”,	
in:	R.	Brown	(ed.) Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change: Papers 
in the Sociology of Education,	Tavistock,	London	1973,	pp.	71–112;	
also	P.	Bourdieu,	The Logic of Practice, Stanford University Press, 
Palo	Alto,	1990;	idem,	Pascalian Meditations, Stanford University 
Press,	Palo	Alto	2000.
76 G. Minassian, Le rêve brisé des Arméniens 1915, Flammarion, 
Paris	2015,	p.	29.
77	 J.R.	Volhardt,	“Interpreting	Rights	and	Duties	After	Mass	Vio-
lence”,	Culture & Psychology 2012,	vol.	18,	no.	1,	pp.	133–145.
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especially), new military alliances, changes of demographic 
balance	and	military	global	forces.	In	Bourdieu’s	terms	this	
complexity involves reproduction of economic, social, cultur-
al and symbolic capital. However, there are at least two oth-
er	forms	of	capital	that	should	be	considered:	demographic 
capital (it is a core capital in the case of genocide that aims 
to annihilate an entire category of people) and moral capital:	
as the moral capital diminishes (and denial is a sure road 
toward moral bankruptcy) the level of mistrust among com-
munities will grow. The worst scenario, which is also real, is 
that the chances of immoral development of individual and 
collective	actors	(Fig.	1)	will	increase	as	genocidal	practices	
are denied, imitated, spread and increased through mecha-
nisms of societal learning.
The Armenian genocide poses a hard socio-cognitive, 
moral and historical dilemma due to the long-term silence 
of the world political institutions, of many governments, 
and of course, of the way Turkish official politics approach 
the	1915	events	as	well	as	much	older	forms	of	collective	
violence	practiced	by	the	Ottoman	Empire	since	1789	as	it	
is	documented	by	Gőçek	Müge	on	the	qualitative	analysis	
of	over	300	memoirs.78 According to recent complex mod-
els of denial, as that worked out by Friedrichs79, the mode 
in which individuals cope with tractable and intractable long 
term or short-term problems implies costs and benefits. Frie-
drichs’s model of denial versus avowal strongly suggests that 
the rationality of denial has intrinsic limits that could make 
the costs much higher than the possible benefits for the well-
being.	His	model	posits	that:	“the	denial	has	both	rational	
and	irrational	features”;	the	interplay	between	these	fea-
tures is best captured by “a utilitarian-rationalist framework 
stretched	to	its	limits”;	“most of the mystery about denial dis-
appears when we accept that is premised on a twisted kind 
of rationality”.80 However, the model deals mainly with deni-
al	at	individual	level	(at	the	denier	level)	while	she/he	faces	
individual tractable or intractable problems (such as cancer, 
78	 F.	Gőçek	Müge,	Ottoman Past…
79	 J.	Friedrichs,	“Useful	Lies:	The	Twisted	Rationality	of	Denial”,	
Philosophical Psychology 2014,	vol.	27,	no.	2,	pp.	212–234.
80	 Ibidem,	p.	220.
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or pimples, cheating to one’s partner, even homicide) but 
does not provide a formal conceptualization for the situa-
tion in which denial implies a collective perpetrator (most 
of the time the denier) and a collective victim (who might be 
a denier or might try to obtain and avowal or apology), as 
is the case of genocides. The pattern of denial analyzed by 
Friedrichs is assumed to become more painful when the pro-
cess takes place between collective actors. Finally, it seems 
reasonable to take into account that denial could work both 
in the case of evil acts, which are denied by the perpetrator 
and in the case of good acts, which might be denied by the 
beneficiary who does not express gratitude, and the worst, 
might display resentments against the helper.
The search for historical meaning of events that have 
long term consequences is associated with the development 
of	“macro-narrative”.81 It seems that a cost-benefit analysis 
of	long-term	denial	(over	100	year),	as	it	is	the	case	with	
the genocide suffered by the Armenians, should take into 
account that for such kind of macro-events the temporal 
dimension of denial might have consequences on the his-
torical trajectory of collective identity. It is more and more 
evident that communities that have been denied to express 
their own identity, due to ethnic, religious, political and 
combined causes strive to search and affirm their long-
term	repressed	identity,	as	explored	by	Kessel.82 The very 
fact that denial blocks the construction of a cross-cultur-
ally shared macro-narrative of tragic events might have 
negative consequences on the continuity of collective iden-
tities. The present study assumes that the maneuvering 
social space for denial shrinks not only due to the advance-
ment of professional (expert) historical knowledge but also 
due to the mode in which accurate basic historical knowl-
edge enters into the common knowledge and social rep-
resentations	of	more	and	more	common	persons.	Denial,	
especially	in	the	form	of	“WE”,	it	means	a	well	self-defined	
collective	identity,	against	“THEY”,	it	means	an	undiffer-
entiated,	amorphous	“THEY”	(Pagans,	Gentiles,	Infidels,	
81	 J.	Rüsen,	“How	To	Overcome	Ethnocentrism…”,	pp.	118–129.
82	 B.	Kessel,	Suddenly Jewish: Jews Raised as Gentiles Discover 
Their Jewish Roots,	Brandeis	University	Press,	Hannover	2000.
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Enemies	of	the	People,	Non-Communists)	etc.)	imposes	
one sided restrictions to the historically long-term iden-
tities	of	“Other(s)”	and	elevates,	beyond	any	comparison,	
the	status	of	“WE”.	The	problem	is	the	incommensurable	
identity	gap	forced	by	an	auto-centric	dichotomy	“WE”	ver-
sus	“NON-WE”	Logically,	historically	and	psychologically	
the	division	between	a	well-defined	“WE”	and	an	inten-
tionally	fuzzy	and	generalized	“THEY”,	which	is	without	
specific identities is the result of unsolved identity ques-
tions and a source of perennial identity conflicts. This puz-
zle has been approached by the research of “the need for 
collective self-identity that forms a unique basis for group 
identification”.83 A series of studies84 strongly suggest the 
uniqueness and significant function of collective self-con-
tinuity in contrast with other social identity sources. The 
findings	of	these	studies	show	that	“existential	threat”	
enhances feelings of self-continuity which in turn leads 
to a stronger opposition toward the presence of Muslims 
in the Netherlands. The concept of collective self-identity 
approached as a historical continuity, developed as “per-
ceived	collective	continuity”	by	Sani	and	colleagues85 and 
as	“trans-generational”	group	by	Kahn	and	colleagues86 
has significant theoretical, experimental and practical 
ramifications helping to better understand and cope with 
complex inter-group realities across the world. The study 
assumes that also the need for collective self-identity might 
have specific features in the case of those collective identi-
ties for which the existential threat turned long time ago 
into	a	mega-tragedy,	“great	catastrophe”,	i.e.,	genocide. 
83	 A.	Smeekes,	M.	Verkuyten,	“The	Presence	of	the	Past:	Identi-
ty	Continuity	and	Group	Dynamics”,	European Review of Social Psy-
chology 2016,	vol.	26,	p.	162.
84	 A.	Smeekes,	M.	Verkuyten,	“Collective	Self-continuity,	Group	
Identification	and	In-group	Defense”,	Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 2013,	vol.	49,	pp.	984–994.
85	 M.	Sani,	M.	Bowe,	C.	Herrera	et	al.,	“Perceived	Collective	Con-
tinuity:	Seeing	Groups	as	Entities	That	Move	through	Time”,	Euro-
pean Journal of Social Psychology 2007, vol.	37,	pp.	1118–1134.
86	 D.T.	Kahn,	Y.	Klar,	S.	Roccas,	“For	the	Sake	of	the	Eternal	
Group:	Perceiving	the	Group	as	Trans-Generational	and	Endurance	
of	Ingroup	Suffering”,	Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
2017,	vol.	43,	no.	2,	pp.	272–283.
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For	instance,	this	is	the	case	of	Eastern	and	Southern	Euro-
pean countries that have suffered for centuries, under the 
Ottoman	Rule,	economic,	demographic,	cultural	and	spir-
itual damages. The denial of the Armenian genocide pos-
es huge hurdles to the collective identity of all the actors 
involved in the conflict, inclusively to the political dimen-
sion of the global identity (humanity). A comprehensive 
study of the issue cannot set aside other collective iden-
tities that suffered in the same geopolitical space, as it 
would	be	the	Greek	identity.	A	few	of	these	reasons	are:	
(1)	the	denial	of	the	genocide	is	associated	with	the	birth	
of	the	modern	(post-Ottoman)	Turkish	state;	(2)	the	deni-
al is tacitly accepted because of the errors made during it 
and mainly after it by a series of great powers (Germany, 
UK,	for	instance);	(3)	the	denial	is	not	directly	confront-
ed because are other nations that have been built on the 
territory (vatra) originally owned by former nations that 
have been the first settlers or previous settlers but declined 
under these demographic, economic and cultural invasions 
(Australia,	North	America,	South	America	etc.);	(4)	longer	
the denial more difficult will be for its supporters to reverse 
positions especially if the present political interests are 
inclining the balance toward the former perpetrators.
(II) Historical, cultural, sociological, psychologi-
cal and political sources and studies focused on the 
1915 genocide. First, there are the sources provided by 
highly credible witnesses and survivors of the genocide and 
the press and the official declarations of the time.87 Toyn-
bee’s	work	of	1917	uses	in	its	title	the	statement	made	in	the	
“Joint Note of the Allied Governments in answer to Pres-
ident	Wilson”	that	says:	The	liberation	of	the	peoples	who	
87 A.P. Hakobian, Armenia and the War. An Armenian’s Point 
of View with an Appeal to Britain and the Coming Peace Confer-
ence,	with	a	Preface	by	the	Rt.	Hon.	V.	Bryce	O.	M.,	George	H.	Doran	
Company,	New	York,	1920;	also	H.	Morgenthau,	Ambassador Mor-
genthau’s Story. Henry Morgenthau former American Ambassador 
in Turkey,	Doubleday,	Page	&	Company,	New	York,	1918;	A.J.	Toyn-
bee, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents 
Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon,	Hodder	and	Stoughton,	Lon-
don	1916;	A.J.	Toynbee,	The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks, with 
a	Preface	by	Visocunt	Bryc.	Hodder	and	Stoughton,	London,	New	
York,	Toronto	1917.
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now	lie	beneath	the	murderous	tyranny	of	the	Turks”.88 Mor-
genthau, the U.S.A. Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, does 
document in his landmark account the stages of the Arme-
nian genocide including the positions of the main political 
actors revealing both the demographic destruction as well 
as the political intention and planning behind it.89 Mor-
genthau	reproduces	his	conversations	with	high	rank	Otto-
man	officials	(Mehmet	Talât,	İsmail	Enver	or	the	Grand	
Vizir	–	Saïd	Halim)	that	make	obvious	the	political	intention	
to destroy an entire nation. Field realities confirmed these 
intentions.	For	instance,	he	refers	to	Djevdet	Bey,	broth-
er	in-law	of	Enver	Pasha	who	came	to	Van	with	“definite	
instructions	to	exterminate	all	Armenians	in	this	province”.	
In	April	1915,	in	district	North	of	Lake	Van	only	“in	three	
days	24,000	Armenians	were	murdered”.90	The	Lutheran	
priest Martin Rades, provided records and referred to the 
previous	atrocities	against	Armenians	in	1896	in	the	Otto-
man	Empire:	“It	is	impossible	to	assess	what	consequences	
will have on future generations the mode in which the society 
and	the	press	are	discussing	today	(1896)	the	atrocities	suf-
fered by the Armenians. Nowadays generations learn to obey 
to an idol of opportunism and of realpolitik, which, if it will 
become	dominant,	will	eliminate	all	noble	inclinations”.91	Let-
ters	sent	from	Constantinopole	since	1895	indicated	a	clear	
increase of intolerance toward the Armenians. The French 
Ambassador,	Paul	Cambon	in	letters	to	his	mother	refers	
to	“abominable”	acts	of	violence	against	inoffensive	Armeni-
ans,	which	announce	“new	massacres”.92
Toynbee93 dedicated analytic studies to the Armenian gen-
ocide. His demographic overview has a great value for better 
88 A.J. Toynbee, The Murderous Tyranny…,	p.	1.
89 H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story…,	pp.	203–209,	
301–312,	336–359.
90	 Ibidem,	p.	297.
91 A. Meissner, Martin Rades ‘Christliche Welt’ und Armenians. 
Bausteine für eine internationale Ethik des Protestantismus,	LIT,	Ber-
lin	2010,	pp.	80–81.
92	 P.	Cambon,	Correspondence 1820–1924,	Grasset,	Paris	1940,	
p.	393.
93 A.J. Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire…
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grasping the dimensions of the inhumane loss of demographic 
capital.	There	is	strong	evidence	that	the	1915–1923	genocide	
had devastating effects on various forms of capital (econom-
ic, social, cultural) and on their reproduction as this process 
is	defined	by	Bourdieu.94 The size of the economic as docu-
mented by Selian95	is	huge.	Beyond	and	above	these	dam-
ages	is	the	loss	of	demographic	capital.	In	1913	in	the	main	
vilayets96	1	016	000	Armenians	have	been	living.	The	total	
Armenian	population	living	in	Ottoman	Turkey	by	the	same	
time	being	of	approximately	2	000	000.	The	proportion	of	the	
two	major	communities	was	as	follows:	Moslems	45.1%	and	
Armenians	(Christians)	was	45.2%,	the	rest	of	9.7%	were	
other religions (ethnic groups). Today Turkey population 
is	80	274	604,	while	the	Armenian	population	in	Turkey	is	
between	50,000–70,000.	Even	if	one	would	accept	the	number	
of	600,000	massacred	Armenians,	lowest	number	mentioned	
in the Turkish narrative, it must be noticed that the Turk-
ish	population	increased	six	times	(from	some	13	170,	000	
in	1915	up	to	80	274	604	in	2017).	Armenian	population	
in	Turkey	decreased	since	1915	dramatically	even	if	we	do	
not make theoretical extrapolations based on a similar popu-
lation	growth	(6	times	growth	between	1915	and	2017	for	the	
Turkish	population).	This	decrease	ranges	between	10	times	if	
one	accepts	the	number	of	600,000	victims	and	25	times	if	one	
uses	the	number	of	1	500	000	victims.	The	inhumane	destruc-
tion of the demographic capital represents an essential com-
parative measure for an assessment of the pre-genocide and 
post-genocide balance across various situations. The demo-
graphic capital cannot be owned by any person, political pow-
er or government. Its nature is qualitatively different from 
that of economic and financial capital because it is produced 
and shared during historical continuity by a given commu-
nity (nation, ethnic group, etc.).
Most of the saved archives, mainly in Western democratic 
countries, that contain information about the genocide have 
94	 P.	Bourdieu,	“Cultural	Reproduction…”;	idem,	The Logic of Prac-
tice; idem, Pascalian Meditations.
95 S. Selian, Istoria unui genocid îndelung ignorat, Ararat, 
Bucureşti	2015,	pp.	310–311.
96 A.J. Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire…
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been	closed	up	to	2000.	In	addition	to	this	even	landmark	
published reports and works, such as those of Morgenthau 
or Toynbee had a very limited circulation within cultures 
that are sensitive to this issue. For instance, Morgenthau’s 
story (memoirs) has been published in Romania, a country 
that	received	Armenian	refugees	since	1896,	only	in	2000	
(Ararat Publisher, i.e., a publishing house of the Armenian 
community) with a preface by James Rosapepe, the Ambas-
sador of the U.S.A. in Romania.
Second, there are records produced by the victims, sur-
vivors	and	their	direct	descendants.	Diaries	and	letters	
of the victims and those who escaped the genocide repre-
sent reliable sources as is the journal of Stepan Miskjian97 
(1897–1917),	published	in	1964–1965.	His	granddaughter,	
based on the detailed notes of Miskjian achieved, almost one 
hundred years later, a re-constitutive journey from his birth-
place	to	the	deportation	place	–	Deir	Zor.98 The testimonies 
of	the	survivors	of	1896	and	1915	collected	in	reliable	and	
systematic mode99 are essential sources for documenting the 
genocidal process. There are shorter recollections100). Such 
documents grasp the traumas lived by victims and their sur-
vivors. Psychosocial studies based on in depth interviews 
with survivors101 reveal the long-term consequences of the 
traumatic events.
Third, there are the historical studies, starting with the 
classical sources102 and a growing number of more recent 
historical	studies	that	achieve	a	number	of	essential	tasks:	
 97 S. Miskjian, Yes Der Zori Tzhokhh’n Pakhadz Em (I escaped from 
the Hell of Deir Zor). Part 1 – 1916), Part 2 – 1916–1919, Haratch, 
Paris	1964–1965.
 98	D.A.	MacKeen,	The Hundred Years Walk: An Armenian Odys-
sey,	Houghton	Mifflin	Harcourt,	Boston	2016.
 99 V. Svazlian, op. cit.
100	B.	Dosar	Horasangian	(1915),	Observator Cultural 2015;	
E.	Kanterian,	“Satul	fără	nume”,	transl.	in Observator Cultural from 
Tachles – Das Jüdische Wochenmagazin,	pe	24	aprilie	2015.
101	 L.	Boyajian,	H.	Grigorian,	“Psychosocial	Sequelae	in	the	Arme-
nian	Genocide”,	in:	R.G.	Hovannisian	(ed.),	The Armenian Genocide 
in Perspective,	Introduction	by	T.	Des	Pres.	Transactions	Publishers,	
London	2007,	pp.	108–114.
102 A.J. Toynbee, op. cit.; H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s 
Story…
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(1)	searching	for	and	analyzing	historical evidence regard-
ing	the	genocide;	(2)	critical	approaches	of	various	forms 
of denial and of the mass production of false social rep-
resentations about the events and the victims (blaming 
the victims, considering them traitors, etc.); (3) exploring 
the causes of official resistance of various countries, and 
first of all that of Turkish authorities, to recognize genocide; 
(4)	revealing	the	societal modeling role	of	the	Ottoman	and	
Turkish authoritarian structures and procedures for totali-
tarian leaders and regimes. These are the main sources and 
research directions that have been used in the present study. 
These directions are strongly intertwined and are exposing 
the long-term denial of the genocide, the reluctance and 
the oscillations of many political, educational, and research 
institutions to approaching the genocide question. The atti-
tude to this question seems to be influenced in a high degree 
by the dynamics of geopolitical situations and forces during 
the	last	100	years.	It	means	that	we	face	a	dilemma	of	cop-
ing with historical truth while being at the same time able 
to fairly asses and respect the achievements, the positive 
role played by the main collective actors (Turkish mainly) 
during such a long period relation toward a series of strong 
geopolitical crises. An important starting point for the glob-
al	consciousness	is	the	work	of	Carzou103 followed by series 
of works that cover the various aspects of the genocide such 
as:	its	ideological	roots,	political	organizations,	inclusively	
the	decisions	of	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	Par-
ty	(ITTIHAD,	1–12	November	1910),	military	forces,	polit-
ical leaders, procedures, inclusively deportations to some 
2000	km	distance	(walked),	rape,	forced	adoption,	forced	
assimilation, mass killings, the destruction of cultural and 
religious landmarks (inclusively cemeteries), the transfor-
mation of language, relations among majority and minorities 
and the use of some minorities against other minorities 
in mass violence, the denial of genocide, its demographic 
dimension and the suffering of the victims and survivors.104
103	J.M.	Carzou,	Arménie 1915. Un génocide exemplaire,	Calmann-
Lévy,	Paris	1975/2006.
104	F.	Adanir,	“Armenian	Deportations	and	Massacres	in	1915”,	in:	
D.	Chirot,	M.E.P.	Seligman	(eds),	Ethnopolitical Warfare. Causes, 
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A turning point for the world consciousness is represent-
ed	by	the	Common	Declaration	John	Paul	II	and	Karekin	II:	
“The extermination of a million and half of Armenian Chris-
tians, in what is generally referred to as the first genocide 
of twentieth century”	(27	September,	2001).	In	2015,	with	
the occasion of one hundred years commemoration of the 
genocide, Pope Francis delivered his message to Armeni-
ans and reinforced the previous evaluation with this occa-
sion	(April	12,	2015).
During	time	have	been	many	attempts	to	organize	public	
coherence on the genocide suffered by the Armenians. For 
instance, an academic conference in Turkey on the genocide 
Consequences and Possible Solutions	(pp.	71–81).	American	Psy-
chological	Association,	Washington,	DC	1999;	see	also	T.	Akçam,	
A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turk-
ish Responsibility,	Metropolitan	Books,	New	York	2006;	R.	Bilali,	
“National	Narrative	and	Social…”,	pp.	16–33;	L.	Boyajian,	H.	Grigori-
an,	“Psychosocial	sequelae…”;	H.	Bozarslan,	V.	Dulcert,	R.	Kévorkian,	
Comprendre…;	D.	Chirot,	Modern Ty rants: The Power and Preva-
lence of Evil in Our Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 
1994;	D.	Chirot,	D.	Karell,	“Identity	Construction…”;	V.N.	Dadri-
an,	“The	Armenian	Genocide	and	the	Pitfalls	of	a	Balanced	Analy-
sis”,	American Forum 1988, vol.	1,	no.	2.	pp.	730–130;	V.N.	Dadrian,	
The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Bal-
kans to Anatolia to the Caucasus.	Third,	revised	edition,	Berghahn	
Books,	Providence	1997;	R.H.	Dekmejian,	Determinants of Ge no cide: 
Armenians and Jews as Case Stu dies,	in:	R.G.	Hovannisian	(ed.),	The 
Armenian Genocide in Perspective	(pp.	81–96),	Introduction	by	T.	Des	
Pres.	Transactions	Publishers	Dictionaries,	London	2007;	N.	Webster	
(1847),	An American Dictionary of English Language, Harper and 
Brothers,	New	York,	2007;	F.	Dündar,	Crime of Numbers: The Role 
of Statistics in the Armenian Question 1878–1918, Transaction Pub-
lishers,	London	2010;	F.	Gőçek	Müge,	Ottoman Past…;	S.	Hanioğlu, 
Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton	2011;	S.	Ihrig,	Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, Harvard 
University	Press,	Cambridge,	MA	2014;	N.	Iorga,	Byzance after Byz-
ance,	Universitatea	din	Bucureşti,	Bucureşti	1935/2005;	R.	Kévork-
ian, Les Arméniens dans l’Empire Ottoman à la seuille du génocide, 
avec	Paul	B.	Paboudjian,	Arhis,	Paris	1992;	idem,	Le génocide…;	
G.	Kucharczyk,	Pierwszy Holocaust XX wieku, Fronda, Warszawa 
2012;	J.	Lepsius,	Rapport secrete sur les massacres d’Arménie, Payot, 
Paris	1919;	K.	Mouradian,	“Genocide	and	Humanitarian	Resistance	
in	Ottoman	Syria	1915–1916”,	Études Arméniennes Contemporaines 
2016, vol.	7,	pp.	32–42;	F.	Ulgen,	Sabiha Gokcen’s 80-year-old Secret. 
Kemalist Nation Formation and the Ottoman Armenians (doctoral 
dissertation),	University	of	California,	San	Diego	2010.
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has	been	first	cancelled	in	Spring	2005105 but could take 
place a few months later.106
The field research has been hindered for a long time 
by dominant narratives that played a very important role 
in the denial and the justification of the violent events 
of	1915.	Among	these	representations	are:	the	conception	
according to which the denial is natural because the vio-
lence, i.e., genocide against the Armenian is embedded 
within the foundational process of the birth of Turkish 
Republic.107	Bozarslan	et	al.,	mention	also	the	resistance	
to open the Turkish archives, the destruction of documents 
and	the	very	late	(long	after	2000)	publications	of	some	
critical documents as the “Cahier noir”	(The	Black	Note-
book)	of	Talât	directly	involved	in	the	genocide.108 The gen-
ocide has been reduced to the problem of warfare during 
a large world conflagration109 and even to the mistreatment 
by Western powers of Turkish autonomy.110
The denial of the genocide should be considered in con-
trast with the opposite orientation which takes its political 
leaders and the procedures as social models. Ihrig, in his 
landmark study of “Atatürk in the nazi imagination”	pro-
vides strong evidence regarding the mode in which totali-
tarian regimes have used the Turkish experience. He refers 
to	“Hitler’s	admiration”	expressed	in	his	speech	of	May	4,	
1941	given	in	Reichstag,	when	the	dictator	said:	“The	great	
105	A.	Labi,	“Academic	Conference	in	Turkey	on	Armenian	Ques-
tion	Is	Cancelled	Under	Government	Pressure”,	Academe Today:	The 
Chronicle of Higher Education’s Daily Report 2005a,	27	May.
106	A.	Labi,	“Despite	Late	Challenge,	Scholars	Finally	Hold	Meet-
ing	in	Turkey	on	Armenian	Genocide”,	Academe Today: The Chroni-
cle of Higher Education’s Daily Report 2005b,	26	September.
107	F.	Dündar,	Crime of Numbers….;	F.	Ulgen,	Sabiha Gokcen’s 
80-year-old Secret…;	Bozarslan,	op.	cit.;	Dulcert	&	Kévorkian	2015,	
op. cit.
108	H.	Bozarslan,	V.	Dulcert,	R.	Kévorkian,	Comprendre…,	
pp.	138–142.
109	V.N.	Dadrian,	Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-
Armenian Conflict,	Transaction	Publishers,	London,	1999;	R.	Kévork-
ian, Les Arméniens dans l’Empire Ottoman…
110	 A.	Zarakol,	“Ontological	(In)security	and	State	Denial	of	Histori-
cal	Crimes:	Turkey	and	Japan”,	International Relations	2010,	vol.	24,	
pp.	3–23.	DOI:	10.1177/0047117809359040.
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ingenious creator of the young Turks was the first to pro-
vide a marvelous role model for the uprising of the allies 
then	abandoned	by	luck	and	horrible	stricken	by	fate”.111 
Taking into account the warning of Rades, the research 
of cognitive theory112 on social learning, and the studies on 
societal learning113	(also	confirmed	elsewhere	by	C.	Mama-
li), major historical actors (good or evil, good and evil) and 
major historical events have the potential to generate 
long term societal learning cycles that could be latent and 
manifest.
Studies prove that life stories have a great healing and 
learning potential because they enhance the coherence at the 
personal level.114 At the same time at societal level they help 
post-genocidal generations to build an integrated macro-nar-
rative regarding the suffering of the previous generations. 
However, the development of the macro-narrative accepted 
also by the larger communities is not possible if the victims 
face a long-term official denial of the genocide practiced main-
ly by the government that belongs to the other side. The deep 
traumatic consequences and the complex combination of neg-
ative feelings such as anger, sadness and desperation with 
positive feelings such as hope related to one’s own survival, 
resilience and the birth of new generations of people with 
a	strong	Armenian	identity	are	revealed	by	a	55	years	long	
study	of	oral	history	with	survivors	of	the	1915	genocide	car-
ried out by Svazlian.115 The testimonies collected and recorded 
by Svazlian that include also folk songs are covering a huge 
chrono-spatial interval while the eldest survivor has been 
born	in	1874	in	Sansun.	There	are	testimonies	of	later	on	gen-
erations of survivors that are living in the deportation area 
111 S. Ihrig, Atatürk…,	pp.	116–117.
112	 A.	Bandura,	“Moral	Disengagement	in	the	Perspectives	of	the	
Inhumanities”,	Personality and Social Psychology Review 1999, vol. 3, 
pp.	193–209.
113	 J.	Botkin,	M.	Elmandsjra,	M.	Maliţa,	No Limits to Learning. 
Report to the Club of Rome,	Pergamon,	London	1979.
114	Band-Wiinterstein,	2007.
115 V. Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide and the People’s Histori-
cal Memory,	Gitoutyoun	Publishing	House	of	NAS	RA,	Yerevan	2004;	
idem, The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survi-
vors, op. cit.
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of	Deir-el-Zor.116 A content analysis of these testimonies that 
is part of a different project has identified 30 major themes 
concerning the genocide These major themes have intersecting 
areas due to the nature of harms inflicted on the Armenians. 
For	instance,	the	major	theme	“means	of	annihilation”	(fire	
on crowded churches where Armenian children, women and 
older men took refuge, beheading, impaling, cutting the bel-
ly of the pregnant women to bet on the sex of the child, water 
deprivation, starvation) intersects within some specific areas 
of	a	different	major	theme	such	as	“crimes	against	children”	
(killing the child in front of the parents, rape of the young 
girls and drowning, burying alive, separation from mothers, 
leprosy, starvation etc.) or with the major themes of “physi-
cal	and	symbolic	violence	on	human	body”	(playing	football	
with decapitated heads, setting the piles of corpses in cross 
shape, etc.) all documented by testimonies of the survivors. 
For the present approach these themes are highly relevant 
and	this	why	it	is	useful	to	list	all	of	these	30	major	themes	
present	in	the	testimonies	of	the	survivors	of	1915	genocide:
(1)	Memories of the historic native cradle, peaceful fam-
ily life within a generous natural environment and produc-
tive and friendly community. These major themes include 
memories on all Armenian villages and cities and of villages 
shared	in	good	neighborhood	with	the	Ottoman	Turks	(tes-
timonies	1,	35,	113,	118,	211,	268,	395,	626,	659,	677,	761);
(2)	Historical landmarks from ancient times to more 
recent past of Armenians roots and continuity on the land 
(for instance, since Tigran the Great and also older roots or 
recent events);
(3) Memories of previous massacres of the Armenians 
in 1896 and of waves of growing hostility against Armenians;
(4)	Recollections of a period of celebration and hope nur-
tured by the Turkish Constitution that provided equal rights 
to	Armenians	and	other	nationalities	(”Hůrriet”,	that	means	
freedom	and	the	dethronement	of	Sultan	Hamid	II,	1908);
(5)	The anti-Armenians goals and actions ordered 
by the new Turkish government and by the high officials 
in	1915–1923	genocide	within	the	political	context	of	WWI,	
116	Hakoub	Moutafian,	born	in	1980,	testimony	385,	p.	545.
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1917	Bolshevik	Revolution	and	after	WWI	as	reflected	by	
the experiences and observations lived by the survivors. 
It includes atrocities committed by Young Turks (testimo-
nies	2,	6,	11,	16,	19	83,	86,	105,	111,	117,	134,	145,	150,	152,	
159,	187,	192,	194,	206,	241,	249,	251,	259,	267,	274,	288,	
317,	327,	350,	450,	453,	460,	483,	507,	551,	556,	585,	687);
(6) Consistent patterns of genocidal procedures direct-
ed against the Armenians	 such	as:	officially	disarm-
ing the Armenians, removal (under the pretext of drafts) 
of the young men from their communities; mass arrests; 
public atrocities and killings, forced deportations on foot 
of the remaining women, children and old people, repeat-
ed plundering, stimulation of other ethnic groups (mainly 
Kurds	and	Chechens)	to	harass,	threaten,	plunder	and	kill	
the	Armenians”	(testimonies,	18,	19,	23,	24,	26,	99,	101,	112,	
114,	115,	118,	119,	132,	142);
(7)	Means used in the extermination of Armenians such 
as:	fire	arms,	cold	steel	arms,	bayonets,	swords	(yataghans),	
axes, daggers, pouring kerosene through the roofs of crowd-
ed churches used as refuge by Armenians, mass-immolation, 
drowning, burying alive, burning older persons on bonfires, 
impaling, water deprivation, hanging, crucifixion, starva-
tion,	throwing	into	pits,	dying	of	sunstroke”	(testimonies	2,	
6,	39,	42,	88,	112,	114,	147,191,	228);
(8) Physical and symbolic brutalities against human 
body	such	as:	“beheading,	impaling,	rape,	cutting	off	women	
breasts throwing them to the dogs, cutting nipples, cutting 
the belly of pregnant women and betting on the sex of the 
fetus [also “to lay the woman in childbirth on the ground, 
to drop a paving stone on her head and watch the fetus dart 
out	of	her	womb”,	“to	cut	open	their	belly	and	their	digestive	
organs	in	search	of	gold	coins”],	playing	football	with	decap-
itated	heads,	the	corpses	piled	up	in	the	shape	of	a	cross”	
(13,	17,	39,	59,	111,	121,	159,	170,	153,	155,	170,	171,	177,	
192,	258,	307,	339,	445,	454);
(9)	Loss,	mainly:	loss	of	the	most	members	of	the	fam-
ily [the witness being the only one survivor usually from 
a large family], separation of children from mothers, sep-
aration of siblings, loss of real estate and land, loss of per-
sonal property, loss of cultural and religious artifacts and 
symbols	(testimonies,	1,	2,	3,	10,	64,	67,	113,	200;
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(10)	Violence against children:	killings,	tortures	(some	
in front of the parents), to impale the baby on a stake 
[to	fling	him	away],	starvation	[”grazed	on	grass	like	ani-
mals”,	“drinking	urine”],	changes	of	names	[”starting	from	
now	on	you	are	a	Turk”],	selling	children,	children	slavery,	
begging for food, forcing girls into Turkish marriages, place-
ment into poorly administrated orphanages;
(11)	Cultural and symbolic violence	such	as:	killings	
of intellectuals (teachers, writers, priests, notables) forced 
Turkification (name-changing, interdiction of Armenian lan-
guage and imposing Turkish language), Arabization, forced 
Kurdification,	forced	Islamization,	circumcision,	destruc-
tion of churches, converting churches into flour mills, jail, 
mosques, burning Armenian books, desecration of Armeni-
an	monuments	(testimonies,	1,	10,	14,	16,	22,	13,	48,	210,	
346,	348,	377,	378,	445);
(12)	Planned killings, deportations and atrocities during 
Armenian holy days:	in	April	1909,	during	the	Holy	Week,	
Adana and its environs have been put on fire, vicious crowds 
attacked and plundered Armenian inhabited quarters, on 
28th	of	June	1915	the	Sunday of Vardavar (the transfigu-
ration holyday in the Armenian tradition) Armenians from 
the Taron plain have been “slaughtered with swords, burned 
in	fire,	drowned”	by	Turks	and	Kurds,	and	the	day	has	been	
converted into “Sunday of Martavar”	(burning	of	people,	
in	Armenian	language,	testimony:	1).	Themes	10,	11	and	12	
(also	themes	29	and	30)	are	mainly	focused	on	violence	against	
children, women and symbolic violence. These themes reveal 
the lethal violence against the demographic capital and the 
efforts of the Armenians individuals, communities, churches 
and international organizations to reverse this loss by finding 
the Armenian children that have been denationalized (Turki-
fied, Islamized) and returning them to their cultural matrix. 
For instance, Ekmekçioğlu117 explored in-depth the forcible 
transfer of women and children from one ethnic group to a dif-
ferent ethnic group and its partial reversal in the Armenians’ 
case.	It	has	to	be	reminded	that	within	the	Ottoman	and	Turk-
ish cultural framework the abduction of children and women 
117	 L.	Ekmekçioğlu,	“A	Climate	for	Abduction,	a	Climate	for	
Redemption…”,	pp.	534–541.
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(used	in	‘harems”)	who	belonged	to	other	nationalities,	inclu-
sively to the enemies’ countries, has been a long historical 
practice as it is also the practice of yenicerization (for boys) 
discussed previously. The studies of Svazilian118, and the his-
torical process of yenicerisation strongly suggest that forced 
ethnic conversion, basically a brutal and systematic separa-
tion from one’s family and cultural roots and its possible rever-
sal is much more complex, being in some cases impossible;
(13)	Forced labor camps, labor battalion (”amelé tabour”): 
hard and forced physical work that ended with the killing 
of the workers after they finished the project (for instance 
25	Armenian	engineers	killed	after	building	a	tunnel,	tes-
timony,	251);
(14)	Armenian armed resistance and self-defense groups;
(15) Help received by the Armenians from local people 
of various ethnic and religious backgrounds,	such	as	Bed-
ouins,	Christian	Arabs,	Greeks,	Gypsies,	Kurds	(kirva,	kur-
mandji),	Persians,	Turks,	Yezidi	(testimonies	12,	23,	27,	57,	
106,	111,	139,	159,	164,	169,	220,	221,	247,	355);
(16) Help received from foreign countries,	powers:	Amer-
ica	(The	U.S.A),	France,	Russia	(6,	26,	49,	84,	88,	174,	247,	
281,	283);
(17)	Discontent and anger toward the great powers that 
cooperated with the Turkish government:	mainly	Germa-
ny,	Great	Britain	and	Soviet	Union	under	Lenin,	testimo-
nies	27,	51,	84,	77,	116,	203,	253,	652	–	especially	for	the	
lost	territories	such	as	Kars,	Ardahan,	Igdir	due	to	Lenin-
Kemal	agreement).	There	is	also	the	fact	that	the	Arme-
nian Revolutionary Federation	joined	in	1907	the	Second 
Communist International.119 A puzzling attitude on Arme-
nian Genocide is that of a moral exemplar as Gandhi who 
designed and practiced ahimsa120 and brought a historic con-
tribution to the practice of non-violet resistance and refused 
to join the Communist International. However, Gandhi did 
not express opposition to the Muslim violence that was quite 
well known during his life121;
118 V. Svazlian, op. cit.
119 G. Minassian, Le rêve brisé des Arméniens…
120	C.	Mamali,	The Gandhian Mode…
121	 Singh,	2004,	p.	290.
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(18)	Children orphanages:	mostly	run	by	American	char-
ity organizations;
(19)	Repeated emigration in foreign countries	such	as	Bul-
garia,	Canada,	Egypt,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Irak,	Leb-
anon, Romania, Soviet Armenia, the USA;
(20)	Participation of Armenian survivors to French Resist-
ance against German occupation and to the Great Patriotic 
War (Soviet Union) during the WWII;
(21)	Repatriation in Soviet Armenia, Sovietization and 
deportation of the Armenians survivors in Siberia under Sta-
lin (testimonies	4,	9,	13,	66,	75,	88,	114,	168,	24,	242,	297,	
349,	683,	700122);
(22) Life in exile, mainly in the Syrian desert;
(23)	Diversity of various Armenian organizations and 
of their various political orientation. There other sources that 
show the complexity of this issue, which disclose also the influ-
ence of communist ideology on some Armenian refugees123;
(24)	Armenians saving networks during deportation, geno-
cide, exile that helped to reconnect the survivors and return 
to a safer life;
(25)	Feelings toward the lost native cradle, family, cultur-
al capital and homes;
(26).	Relations with the perpetrators	–	(killing gavür, i.e. 
Christian, a sufficient condition of going to heaven):	(testi-
monies:	1,	95,	97);
(27)	Emotions experienced during and post-genocide and 
related to its long term consequences, denial and/or under-
evaluation by powerful international actors:	bewilderment,	
desperation, anger, sadness inclusively suicide by self-burn-
ing	and	throwing	oneself	into	the	Euphrates,	resilience,	hope:	
(11,	25,	42,	87,	95,	97,	147,	155,	189,	473,	481,	495,	505);
(28)	Reconstructive drive – demographic, cultural, polit-
ical reconstructive trends:	most	of	the	testimonies	refer	
to a powerful demographic rebuilding tendency exempli-
fied	by	the	number	of	children	(some	4.6	per	couple);
122 See V. Arachelian, Siruni: Odiseea unui proscris,	Editura	
Niculescu,	Bucureşti	2011;	S.	Selian,	Schiţă istorică a comunităţii 
armene din România,	Ararat,	Bucureşti	1999.
123 V. Arachelian, op. cit.; P. Istrati, Vers l’autre flame (The confes-
sion of a loser),	Gallimard,	Paris	1929/1987.
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(29)	Identity resilience and development across genera-
tions urging the younger generations to remember the gen-
ocide (1915–1923) connecting the survival of the Armenian 
nation with the living memory, using the names of the martyrs 
as anchoring names for the new generations, striving for the 
complete recognition of the genocide. This represents a strong 
theme across almost all testimonies. It is supported by oth-
er studies on the Armenian genocide that are focused on the 
forcible separation of children from their biological, social, 
cultural and religious cradle and the efforts to reverse this 
violent acculturation process124.
It is also supported by studies on “perceived collective 
continuity”125 and “trans-generational groups”.126 The collec-
tive solidarity during long historical periods that starts with 
the birth event of a collective actor (a nation) seems to be 
strongly activated by existential threats to the group bio-cul-
tural	survival.	Due	to	the	context	of	global	communication	
it is assumed that any public presentation of a significant 
open collective historic wound as it is the Armenian genocide 
that is not officially acknowledged yet by the Turkish gov-
ernment	and	by	at	least	some	80	major	international	actors	
(countries) will trigger other recuperating actions that will 
become more vocal on global scene. It seems that it is not by 
chance that only one single country with a significant Islam-
ic/Muslim	population	recognized	the	genocide	out	of	the	total	
of	28	countries	who	acknowledge	officially	the	genocide	is	
Lebanon	where	it	has	been	and	still	is	a	significant	Arme-
nian population. Studies on the causes and effects of moral 
shock carried by Wisneski and Skitka127 are highly signifi-
cant for historical issues too. Wisneski and Skitka128 show 
that the effects of the moral shock are mediated by disgust 
124	L.	Ekmekçioğlu,	op.	cit.
125	 M.	Sani,	M.	Bowe,	C.	Herrera	et	al.,	“Perceived	Collective	Conti-
nuity”.
126	 D.T.	Kahn,	Y.	Klar,	S.	Roccas,	“For	the	Sake	of	the	Eternal	Group…”.
127	 D.C.	Wisneski,	L.J.	Skitka,	“Moralization	through	Moral	Shock:	
Exploring	Emotional	Antecedents	to	Moral	Convictions”,	Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 2017, vol.	43,	no.	2,	pp.	139–150.
128 Ibidem.
210 | Cătălin Mamali, Mircea Kivu, Jan Kutnik |
and not by anger.129	The	question	is:	what	might	be	the	effect	
of the moral shock of common people who are exposed for 
the first time on history skeletons closet which existence 
is	denied	by	many	official	political	actors?	According	to	the	
field information shared by Alak130, who attempted to collect 
data	on	attitudes	on	1915	from	Romanian	Muslim	popula-
tion she faced a reluctance to participate that looked to be 
nurtured	by	fear.	On	the	other	hand	the	only	one	empirical	
research on Armenian genocide carried in Romania one of the 
authors	(Mamali)	could	identify	achieved	between	2nd and 
15	of	April	2016	as	a	Master	thesis	in	Political	Sciences131 on 
10	members	of	the	Bucharest	Armenian	community	suggests	
that none of the interviewed individuals from the Armeni-
an community “have any personal relationships with mem-
bers	of	the	Turkish	community”.132 The distance between the 
Turkish	and	Armenian	communities	revealed	by	the	10	inter-
views	might	be	surprising	if	we	consider	two	additional	facts:	
(1)	today	in	Bucharest	are	living	soe1361	Armenians	and	
some	2315	Turks;	(2)	the	experiment	carried	by	Travers	and	
Milgram133 on the number of moves (hops) necessary to reach 
a person at thousand miles distance suggests that in six hops 
(through indirect personal contacts starting with a known 
person) one could reach anybody located at a great physical 
distance. No personal contacts between members on the two 
communities, if this is going to be confirmed by other stud-
ies, indicate the huge gap between the descendants of those 
involved	in	1915	events:	denial	is	the	obstacle	that	stands	
in the way of normal personal relationships
All	these	invite	the	question:	what	might	be	the	situation	
when the moral shock is generated by a situation that repre-
sents a threat to the continuity of one’s own group, or to any 
other	group?	The	history	closet	has	a	huge	capital	of	skele-
tons that can be considered also a moral global deficit.
129	 Ibidem,	pp.	146–147.
130 A. Isac Alak, Personal Communication,	Bucharest	2016.
131 G.A. Grigore, Percepţia comunităţii armene din Bucureşti asu-
pra genocidului din anul 1915.	Sesiunea	de	licenţă	iunie,	2016.	Uni-
versitatea	din	Bucureşti,	Faultatea	de	Ştiinţe	Politice	2016.
132	 Ibidem,	p.	35.
133	 J.	Travers,	S.	Milgram,	“An	Experimental	Study	in	the	Small	
World	Problem”, Sociometry 1969,	vol. 35, no.	4,	pp.	425–443.
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These testimonies belong to oral history and reveal 
essential traits shared with later on genocides, as the Hol-
ocaust and more recent genocides. What makes the geno-
cide suffered by the Armenians unique in human history is 
not its size, or the fact that some historians might consid-
er	it	a	tragic	historical	priority	in	the	20th century but its 
long term (over 100 years) denial by the officials represent-
atives of Turkey despite the fact that even historical stud-
ies carried by Turkish historians134 and iconic writers (for 
instance, Pamuk’s public declaration135) recognize it. It has 
to be considered that the archives with documents on Arme-
nian genocide have been sealed for long periods of time, 
a terrible secrecy in the realm of knowledge shared with the 
political secrecy of the design of the genocide. There are cir-
cumstances in which during elections campaigns when can-
didates to the presidency made the promise to recognize 
the genocide but once elected, they downgrade it to the lev-
el of massacre. For instance, even if the USA did work out 
a	document	in	1954	that	recognizes	the	genocide,	and	the	
President	Ronald	Reagan,	in	his	speech	of	April	22	1981,	
has been the first American President to recognize the gen-
ocide. The United States government first acknowledged the 
Armenian	Genocide	back	in	1951,	however	still	the	Ameri-
can	official	recognition	of	1915	events	as	a	genocide	remains	
a task for the future. This goal has met deeply disappointing 
decisions	such	as	that	of	former	President	Barack	Obama	
who	promised	during	elections	of	2008	to	officially	recognize	
the Armenian genocide but even after he received the Nobel 
Prize	of	Peace	and	after	the	100	years	commemoration	still	
downgraded it to a tragic massacre. Such a broken promise 
is a powerful source of moral shock and collective discon-
tent. An Armenian publicist, Harut Sassounian, considered 
that	the	“President	Obama	lost	his	moral	ground”	after	he	
did not recognize the Armenian genocide.136
134	For	instance	T.	Akçam,	A Shameful Act…;	idem,	The Young 
Turks’ Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Eth-
nic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton	2012.
135	 A.	Edemariam,	“Voices	of	Protest:	‘I	Want	to	Continue	the	Life	
I	had	Before”,	The Guardian, April	2,	2006.
136	D.A.	MacKeen,	The Hundred Years Walk…,	p.	287.
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As a direct personal experience, I recall that during the 
International	Conference	of	Psychology	(Berlin,	2008)	I	asked	
a colleague from Turkey, within a psycho-social symposium, 
about	the	conflict	of	1915	between	Turks	and	Armenians.	The	
answer	has	been	“I	do	not	know	about	such	a	conflict”.	Even	
so, some extremely useful field studies have been carried on. 
For	instance,	Bilali137	carried	an	on	line	study	of	93	partici-
pants (Turkish students in the U.S.A.) that suggests that in-
group glorification and perceived in-group threat predicted 
less acknowledgment of in-group responsibility, while “Turk-
ish	participants	placed	most	responsibility	on	Armenians”.138 
The	study	intentionally	did	not	use	the	concept	of	genocide”	
in	order	to	“avoid	reactive	responses	and	drop	outs”.139 The 
findings	show	also	that	65%	of	the	participants	believed	
that	both	groups	“harmed	each	other”,	25%	that	the	Arme-
nians	have	been	the	victims,	and	10%	that	the	“Turks	
were	the	victims	and	the	Armenians	the	harm	doers”.140
If we take into consideration other studies that look 
to historical figures (evil versus good141) it seems impor-
tant to underscore that we have still not enough knowledge 
about what the participants know about major historical 
figures and events. I think that it is necessary to explore 
the accuracy of common knowledge about historical events, 
and mainly about tragic events. False representations 
about mega-violent events are caused, among other fac-
tors, by processes such as moral disengagement142, social 
dominance structures and processes143, system justification 
137	 R.	Bilali,	op.	cit.
138	 Ibidem,	p.	26.
139	 Ibidem,	p.	23.
140	Ibidem,	p.	25.
141	K.	Hanke,	J.H.	Liu,	C.G.	Sibley	et	al.,	“‘Heroes’	and	‘Villains’	
of	World	History.	Across	Cultures”,	Plos One 2015,	pp.	1–21;	J.H.	Liu,	
D.J.	Hilton,	“How	the	Past	Weighs	on	the	Present:	Social	Representa-
tions	on	History	and	Their	Impact	on	Identity	Politics”,	British Jour-
nal of Social Psychology 2005,	vol.	44,	pp.	537–556.
142	A.	Bandura,	“Moral	Disengagement	in	the	Perspectives…”;	idem,	
“Selective	Moral	Disengagement	in	the	Exercise	of	Moral	Agency”, 
Journal of Moral Education 2002,	vol.	31,	pp.	101–119;	A.	Bandura,	
Moral Disengagement…
143	See	F.	Pratto,	J.	Sidanius,	L.M.	Stallworth,	B.F.	Malle,	“Social	
Dominance	Orientation:	A	Personality	Variable	Predicting	Social	and	
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processes144,	errors	of	“master	narratives”145,	“legal	culture”146 
and inter-cultural images on national character.147 There are 
also authors who think that the official recognition of the 
genocide has high chances to remain an unsolved prob-
lem.148 However, because the individuals’ access to knowl-
edge increased and because there is a democratization of the 
production and access to social knowledge supported by com-
puting and Internet149 far beyond the limits of classical social 
participative techniques150 the exploration of the basic com-
mon knowledge about such events represents a necessary 
step.
The	idea	is	that	long	term	denial	(one	hundred	year!)	by	
the official representatives of the perpetrating social forc-
es of a genocide and the timid and partial recognition by 
major international actors (governments) of the same gen-
ocidal reality hinders deeply the development of a healing 
macro-narrative that could help the surviving generations 
of both sides. This long-term delay weakens morally the side 
that is mainly responsible for the genocide but also decreas-
es the moral standing of the silent witnessing social actors 
and at the same time stimulates the emergence of unpre-
dictable long-term reactions from the members of the victim-
ized community and other communities that identify with it. 
Political	Attitudes”,	Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
1994, vol.	67,	pp.	741–763;	also	J.	Sidanius,	J.	Liu,	J.	Shaw,	F.	Prat-
to,	“Social	Dominance	Orientation,	Hierarchy-attenuators	and	Hier-
archy	Enhancers…”,	pp.	338–366.
144	J.T.	Jost,	M.R.	Banaji,	“The	Role	of	Stereotyping	in	System-justi-
fication	and	the	Production	of	FalsC	Consciousness”,	British Journal 
of Social Psychology 1994, vol.	33,	pp.	1–27;	J.T.	Jost,	“Negative	Illu-
sions:	Conceptual	Clarification	and	Psychological	Evidence	Concerning	
False	Consciousness”,	Political Psychology 1995,	vol.	16,	pp.	397–424.
145	J.	Rüsen,	“How	To	Overcome	Ethnocentrism…”
146	G.	Bierbrauer,	“Toward	and	Understanding	of	Legal	Culture:	Vari-
ations	in	Individualism	and	Collectivism	between	Kurds,	Lebanese,	and	
Germans”,	Law and Society Review 1994,	vol.	28,	no.	2,	pp.	243–264.
147	J.	Leerssen,	“Imagology:	History	and	Method”	(pp.	17–32).
148	A.J.	Boekestijn,	“Turkey,	the	World,	and	the	Armenian	Ques-
tion”,	Turkish Politics Quarterly	2005,	pp.	4–6.
149	J.H.	Witten,	“A	Stroll	through	the	Gardens	of	Computer	Sci-
ence”,	in:	C.S.	Calude	(ed.),	The Human Face of Computing, Imperi-
al	College	Press,	London	2016,	p.	132f.
150	C.	Mamali,	op.	cit.
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The long delay of recognition and apologies for committing 
violent societal acts contributes to an increase of their long-
term negative effects on all the sides being a fertile context 
for hatred, arrogance, societal cynicism and vicarious rein-
forcement of violence against others.
Research design
Hypotheses and methods
Hypotheses. The study, which is part of a wider project, 
assumes:
(1)	there is a long-term trans-generational) societal learn-
ing progress that might feed mainly false representations, 
mixed representations and mainly accurate social represen-
tations on past events. It implies that both good and evil soci-
etal processes can be transmitted over generations;
(2) the repression of truth about historical events repre-
sents a long-term societal danger. Stronger the repression 
and the denial of historical truth about mega-violent events 
more dangerous will the reactions of collective actors and 
more unpredictable will they be;
(3) the stronger the repression and the denial (which 
is associated with the lack of apologies) the higher the 
chances for immoral development of individuals and col-
lective actors (for the concept of immoral development see 
figure 1);
(4) it is expected that landmark societal events related 
to the Armenian genocide as the commemoration of 100 years 
will: (a) increase significantly the proportion of common peo-
ple who have an accurate basic historical knowledge on the 
genocide (so this knowledge should be significantly greater 
after 2015 commemoration than the accuracy of the knowl-
edge prior to 2015); (b) the accuracy of basic knowledge com-
bined with the degree of certainty about this knowledge will 
be much greater after the commemoration than prior to 2015 
commemoration;
(5) the questioning potential will be strongly enhanced by 
the accurate basic knowledge, i.e., those participants who 
possess a basic historical knowledge will generate more ques-
tions, on a wider significant problematic spectrum than those 
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who lack basic accurate historical knowledge (the collective 
actors involved and the size of the lethal violence).
The first 3 hypotheses have been approached in previous 
stages of this project.151 This study is focused mainly on the 
last	3	hypotheses	(4a	and	4b,	and	5).
Also the study considers the wider political context 
despite the fact that this can be done at this stage through 
rather	speculative	assumptions	as:
(1)	The	basic	knowledge	about	the	genocide	suffered	by	
the Armenians is going to be more limited within countries 
that suffered long-term repression;
(2)	Public	commemorations,	which	bring	into	the	public	
discourse such events, might increase the number of people 
with basic accurate knowledge on such events. The centen-
nial	commemoration	(April	2015	–	inclusively	the	declara-
tion of Pope Francis) is assumed to play a threshold role 
in expanding the basic accurate knowledge about the geno-
cide suffered by the Armenians.
Methods
The	research	uses	two	types	of	methods:
(1)	a	short	questionnaire	that	presented	14	pairs	of	per-
petrators	and	victims,	13	of	them	being	not	only	false	but	
with an extremely low probability for a credible “history 
scenario”	for	the	year	of	1915.	Starting	with	the	first	waves	
of	post	100	years	commemoration	survey	(2016	and	2017)	
and intending to apply it in other countries on representa-
tive national samples the questionnaire added a few items 
(see	Appendix	1);
(2)	a	non-directive	technique,	self-inquiry152 that puts the 
participants in the position to generate questions instead 
of answering to the researcher’s pre-established questions. 
It keeps a balance between the two major actors (Turks 
and Armenians) by reversing their order in the two forms 
of the technique in order to avoid any possible influence 
of the order of the topics (actors included) toward which 
questions are oriented. The self-inquiry has three major 
151	 C.	Mamali,	“Accuracy	of	Basic	Knowledge	of	Traumatic	Histor-
ical…”.
152	 C.	Mamali,	“Democratization	of	the	Social	Research	Process”.
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levels:	(a)	impersonal	self-inquiring	level,	focused	only	on	the	
problem that includes the two opposite representations on 
the	vents	of	1915;	(b)	interpersonal	inquiry	oriented	toward	
specific social actors and roles. This has two distinct phas-
es. In the first phase the instructions orient the question-
ing potential toward past political leaders (active during the 
1915	events).	In	the	second	phase	the	instructions	orient	
the questions toward political leaders who are contempo-
rary with the respondents; (c) directed self-inquiry, self-
addressed	questions	(Appendix	2).	The	self-inquiry	has	been	
applied	in	face	to	face	situation	(N	=	268	respondents	in	the	
U.S.A. and Romania) on convenience samples. In the present 
study will be used only the first sample. Also the technique 
has	been	applied	restoring	to	Facebook	(N	=	139).
Participants
Participants and findings from the previous studies car-
ried	(since	2007)	out	as	anon-funded	research	are	used.153 
They	include	24	convenience	samples	(N	=	946	prior to the 
2015	commemoration,	N	=	341	post commemoration, with 
almost equal distribution of male and female participants 
from	5	countries,	plus	3	international	conferences,	partic-
ipants	in	the	convenience	sample	from	32	countries).	Two	
waves (prior) on representative national samples carried out 
in	Romania	in	1915,	N	=	1231	prior	to	the	commemoration,	
and	in	2016,	N	=	1589	after	commemoration	(for	both	sam-
ples	only	the	data	form	respondents	of	18	years	and	older	
will	be	presented).	Both	samples	are	representative	for	gen-
der,	age,	educational	level,	SES,	and	the	historical	regions	
of Romania). The data have been collected by a trained team 
from Mercury Research, a specialized institution in national 
surveys	–	Bucharest,	Romania.	The	technique	of	self-inquiry	
has	been	applied	after	participants	(N	=	329)	answered	to	the	
instrument designed to find out the accuracy of basic his-
torical knowledge on the genocide after which all the par-
ticipants have been asked to answer to the self-inquiry 
technique,	and	268	completed	the	second	task	(self-inquiry).	
153	 C.	Mamali,	“Accuracy	of	Basic	Knowledge	of	Traumatic	Histor-
ical…”.
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The wider project includes a study on far distant tragedies 
(Titanic disaster, April 1912) in order to assess comparative-
ly the way in which time and media affect the long-term col-
lective memory. This study uses an instrument that has an 
identical structure with that used on the accuracy of basic 
knowledge	on	genocide	but	replaces	the	14	pairs	of	victims-
perpetrators	with	14	names	of	ships	might	suffered	a	tragic	
accident with many victims.
Findings
The convenience samples are processed for three distinct 
periods:	1.	Before commemoration of the Armenian geno-
cide, at great temporal distance from commemoration, over 
4 years)	2007–2011;	2.	Before commemoration, but short tem-
poral distance to the commemoration (a few months prior 
to	the	100	years	on	in	April	2015);	3.	Post commemoration 
of the genocide:	May	–	November	2015.
1.	The group at great temporal distance from commemo-
ration	(2007–2011).	In	the	“far	temporal	distance	condition”	
from	the	–	commemoration	only	4.3%	participants	had	been	
able	to	identify	the	pair	Ottoman	Turks	versus	Armenians	
as	the	accurate	answer	out	of	14	pairs.	The	participants	
in	the	“short	temporal	distance”	from	the	commemoration	
have	been	able	in	a	much	greater	proportion	(15.7%)	to	accu-
rately	identify	the	pair	involved	in	the	1915	conflict.	The	dif-
ference between these two intervals, few years before and 
just a few months before the commemoration is significant 
x2	=	36.297,	p	<	.001.
2.	The	difference	between	the	answers	collected	few	
months before the commemoration of the genocide and 
few months after the commemoration of the genocide with 
the participation of Pope Francis and many public debates 
across the world and increased number of scientific and pop-
ularizing publications shows a significant increase of accu-
rate	answers:	15.7%	accurate	answers	few	months	before	
commemoration	and	30.8%	after	the	commemoration	of	the	
Armenian genocide (x2	=	24.017,	p	<	.001).	These	results	
strongly suggest that societal ignorance on macro-societal 
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violence can be relatively rapidly reduced by modern means 
of communication mainly if they are supported by moral 
authority figures. There are significant difference between 
participants who are social scientists (psychologists, includ-
ed) and the other participants (x2	=	91.519,	p	<	.0001).
3. The general findings on the two Romanian national rep-
resentative samples show a very low level of basic historical 
knowledge	about	the	Armenian	genocide	(wave	1	in	2015,	
pre-100	years	commemoration	only	8%	identified	accurately	
the	pair	of	victims	and	perpetrators	and	wave	2	in	2016,	after	
100	years	commemoration	of	the	genocide	8.8%	provided	the	
accurate	answer).	Between	the	two	waves	there	a	small	but	
insignificant increase of the answers that reflect an accurate 
basic historical knowledge even after the commemoration. So, 
an event such as commemoration did not have a significant 
effect, as predicted on the accuracy of basic historical knowl-
edge.	Because	all	the	other	samples	that	did	show	a	signifi-
cant change have been convenience samples these findings 
invite a challenging question. Why in other countries the 
change	has	been	significant?	A	few	factors	need	to	be	con-
sidered	such	as:	the	structure	of	the	samples	(convenience	
versus representative), major differences in the ways major 
news	(as	commemoration	of	100	years	of	the	Armenian	gen-
ocide) are represented by mass-media in Romania and other 
countries,	differences	in	which	the	1915–1923	events	are	rep-
resented in history textbooks and the official position of the 
countries on the Armenian genocide (denial, downgrading 
to the category of massacre, silence, assessing the events as 
genocide). These findings on the Romanian samples are more 
surprising if one considers that Romania received Armenian 
refugees	since	1896	and	especially	survivors	of	1915–1923	
events, has a historically old and significant Armenian popu-
lation, and its territory has been a few hundred years under 
the	dominance	of	Ottoman	Empire	till	the	independence	
war	(1877)	as	discussed	previously.	The	fact	that	Romania	
received a great number of Armenian refugees, with so called 
Nansen passports, does not mean that this wave of refu-
gees did not face difficulties. There are studies that indicate 
that the loyalty to the Romanian state of these refugees has 
been questioned and also that some joined extreme political 
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organizations (communist or fascist) as suggests the archi-
val studies.154
4.	The	findings	on	the	two	national	representative	sam-
ples reveal also significant differences between those par-
ticipants who provided accurate basic historical knowledge 
on	the	1915	events	and	have	been	at	same	time	confident	
that their answers are correct and those participants who did 
provide accurate answers but declared themselves as being 
rather uncertain about the correctness of their answers, 
i.e., answer certainty increased significantly between the 
two waves (before and after commemoration). First, answer 
certainty is higher in the case of those who provided accu-
rate responses. These results are significant at the lev-
el	of	each	wave:	wave	1,	pre-commemoration	(March	2015)	
x2	=	19.580,	p	<	.001;	wave	2,	after	commemoration	(March	
2016)	x2	=	52,115,	p	<	.001.	However,	when	compared	the	two	
waves it is obvious that this correlation is significantly strong-
er	for	wave	2	(after	commemoration),	which	means	that	the	
degree of confidence of those who selected the accurate answer 
did	increase	significantly	after	the	commemoration	of	2015:	
x2	=	45.248,	p	<	.001.	These	findings	suggest	that	the	public	
discourse, and especially relevant declarations on the gen-
ocide	1915–1923	influence	the	common	representations	on	
the event. It seems that this influence remains still restrict-
ed to a limited category. This invites further questions on the 
global	“air-time”,	“internet	space”,	“tv-space”	for	this	event	and	
possible competing news such as the celebration (inclusively 
with high profile representatives of the defeated armies who 
did	commemorate/celebrated	the	fight)	of	the	Turkish	victory	
at Gallipoli. It is reasonable to assume that such competitive 
knowledges do have contradictory effects on the macro-soci-
etal dissonance that exist within nations and across nations.
5.	The	findings	based	on	the	two	Romanian	national	sam-
ples suggest that education and the types of sources (only 
in	2016	wave)	are	associated	with	a	greater	accuracy	of	basic	
154	S.C.	Ionescu,	“Loyal	Citizens	or	Dangerous	Stateless	Refugees?	
The	‘Armenian	Question’	in	World	War	II.	Romania	1940–44”,	Jour-
nal on Genocide Research 2017.
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historical	knowledge	on	the	1915	genocide.	For	instance,	high-
er levels of education are associated with a higher accuracy 
of	basic	historical	knowledge	on	the	1915	events.	However,	
a surprising trend is revealed by the convenience sample 
in	Poland	(N	=	56,	out	of	which	44.6%	participants.	Compar-
atively	the	proportion	of	accurate	answers	is	some	5	times	
higher than the national representative sample, and some 
3 times higher than the Romania convenience sample. In the 
Polish case the level of education makes no significant differ-
ence in the accuracy of the basic historical knowledge. These 
findings invite, besides the different nature of the samples, 
to consider wider social and cultural factors. It seems that 
within the Polish cultural context since a quite long time 
(old aggressions against Poland’s territorial integrity, also 
the	relatively	recent	experience	of	Solidarność	movement)	
forged a stronger informed sensitivity toward past events 
at the societal level. This might mean that the basic histor-
ical knowledge regarding major events is relatively homog-
enously shared by the entire population. This speculation 
deserves to be explored by a study on a national represent-
ative sample. The knowledge about the Armenian genocide 
may also be influenced by historical relations between Poles 
and Armenians, dating back to the Middle Ages and based 
on common faith and converging military interests (when 
the	Ottoman	Empire	was	a	shared	enemy).	For	centuries,	
Armenians served in the Polish army and were respected 
soldiers.	Currently,	there	is	a	very	active	Armenian	minor-
ity in Poland, whose representatives have carried out vari-
ous	activities	since	2000	to	commemorate	the	victims	of	the	
Armenian genocide, as well as to popularize knowledge about 
this tragic event.155	What	is	more,	in	2005,	the	Polish	Parlia-
ment adopted a resolution in which it pays tribute to the vic-
tims of the Armenian genocide in Turkey. This act was widely 
commented on by the Polish mass media.
6.	The	findings	regarding	the	questioning	potential	acti-
vated by proposing to the participants to express their own 
questions	on	1915	events	point	out	that	this	is	indeed	rich	
(See annex). The invitation to generate questions has been 
155	 G.	Tokarz,	“Ludobójstwo	Ormian	w	pamięci	społeczno-politycznej	
III	RP”,	Wschodnioznawstwo 2012, vol. 6,	pp.	117–126.
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accepted	by	81%	participants	of	a	convenience	sample	(volun-
teer participation, without any material reward for the par-
ticipation, and using a snowball approach). The procedure, as 
previously	indicated,	fallowed	the	following	sequence:	(a)	all	
participants answered to the short questionnaire focused on 
basic	historical	knowledge	about	the	event	of	1915	to	see	if	
they	can	identify	accurately	the	pair	of	actors	involved	in	1915	
tragic	events	(Ottoman	Turks	vs.	Armenians);	(b)	the	two	
groups (accurate answers vs. wrong answers) received the self-
inquiry	techniques	that	have	six	different	inquiring	targets:	
impersonal (only the tragic events have been presented as 
the explicit questioning target); Turkish authorities who have 
been	in	power	in	1915;	Armenian	authorities	who	have	been	
in	power	in	1915;	Turkish	authorities	and	who	are	in	power	
today; Armenian authorities who are in power today; explic-
itly self-directed questions. The findings do show that those 
who provided accurate answers expresses a strong inquir-
ing tendency (higher number of questions) at least in three 
ways:	(1)	total number of generated questions (x2	=	48.687,	
p	<	.001);	(2)	number of questions directed toward specific 
actors (x2	=	52.779,	p	<	.001);	(3)	number of self-directed ques-
tions (x2	=	28.433,	p	<	.001).	Even	those	who	did	not	provide	
basic	accurate	answers	on	the	1915	their	questioning	poten-
tial	has	been	high	(37.6%	participants	with	wrong	answers	
regarding	the	pair	of	collective	actors	involved	in	1915	events	
generated	over	10	questions).	This	seems	to	show	that	in	the	
present	cultural	and	political	context	the	1915	events	created	
a strong dissonance in the minds of people who once they come 
in touch with the problem might look for information that can 
reduce the uncertainty, and provided some kind of cognitive 
closure. We take into account that this need might be very 
different for those who belong to the perpetrators’ category 
and those who belong to the victims’ category. As an anecdot-
ic information regarding the attempt to accomplish this study 
on Muslim population that lives in Romania, research that is 
part of a future stage of this project, it is significant to men-
tion that the preliminary observations indicate a resistance, 
even fear, of this category to participate to this study despite 
the fact that the main researcher involved in the data collec-
tion is a self-declared Muslim. At this stage of the research we 
are not even speculating about the reasons of these hurdles.
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Conclusions
The social representations on crimes against humanity might 
vary from groups to groups. However, according to the pre-
sent findings it is essential that these groups should share 
accurate basic historical knowledge about such terrible 
events	as	those	since	1915	to	1923.	The	findings	on	the	Arme-
nian Genocide strongly suggest that the basic accurate his-
torical	knowledge	is	extremely	limited.	Clearly	this	limitation	
is due to personal ignorance but also to the mode in which 
these	events	have	been	represented	during	more	than	100	
years up to present by major collective actors, media, and 
history	textbooks.	Theoretically,	the	1915	events	and	their	
representations indicate a powerful societal, and inter-soci-
etal cognitive dissonance that involves moral, political and 
social-cognitive conflicts between those associated histori-
cally with the category of perpetrators and those associated 
with the category of victims. It seems that there is a strong 
need for closure (cognitive but also with political and mor-
al	motives)	as	it	comes	out	from	the	14	out	of	the	30	themes	
of the testimonies156	provided	by	survivors	of	the	1915	geno-
cide as well as from the questions generated by the partici-
pants in the present research. The need for closure, on both 
sides of this historic conflict, is marked by a deep cognitive, 
political and moral conflict. The postponement of a closure is 
aggravating this open historic wound and represents a nega-
tive model not just for moral disengagement of various collec-
tive actors, more or less powerful, in relation to crimes against 
humanity but, hypothetically, increases the chances of immor-
al development at the global level. The findings regarding the 
questioning potential that is activated in common person by 
the Armenian genocide suggests an important area for future 
participatory action research. The great number of questions 
generated by participants of all ages and walks of life, races, 
ethnicity and religions underscore the importance of “moral 
capital”	and	the	costs	of	denial,	as	defined	by	Friedrichs.157 
The gap in the public knowledge, due to the time and space 
156 V. Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies…
157	 J.	Friedrichs,	“Useful	Lies…”,	pp.	212–234.
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dedicated	by	media,	between	the	information	about	the	1915	
Armenian genocide (still extremely low) on one side and the 
information about the tragic accident of Titanic that hap-
pened 3 years before it due to honest human error that had 
a	much	lower	number	of	victims	(under	1500)	which	is	glob-
ally well-known. This gap between the knowledge about the 
1912	wreckage	of	Titanic,	as	tragic	as	it	has	been,	on	one	side	
(as research in progress indicates) on one side and the basic 
knowledge on the Armenian Genocide on the other side is 
morally	puzzling.	Denial	of	crimes	of	such	a	magnitude	as	
the	genocide	suffered	by	the	Armenians	(1915–1923,	and	the	
massacres	of	1896)	turns	the	problem	of	its	costs	into	a	global	
moral challenge. It might represent also a chance to increase 
what Volhardt158	named	“global	mindedness”.
Even	today	there	are	conflicting	social	representations	
about	the	1915	genocide	as	well	as	about	the	precedent	
homicidal	practices	within	the	Ottoman	Empire.	There	are	
approaches	of	the	1915	Armenian	genocide	and	of	prece-
dent	massacres	against	Armenians	(for	instance	1896,	
1909)	that	are	focused	mostly	on	the	controversies	(”dif-
ferent	versions”)	about	these	horrific	events	and	avoid	the	
issue of denial by the Turkish authorities of the genocide. 
Some of these approaches invoke the questions of reliable 
statistics on the number of victims. There is no doubt that 
detailed studies of all the events, based on reliable sourc-
es	is	necessary	–	and	it	has	been	carried	out	since	those	
times by many observers and direct witnesses. Also, besides 
the resort to the statistics it is necessary to take determine 
if, besides number of victims, there are patterns of violent 
actions on large scale. The last issue is almost completely 
neglected by approaches that are limited to the perspective 
of	“different	versions”	of	the	same	events,	which	eliminates	
the distinction between perpetrators and victims. Regarding 
the	statistics	for	the	massacres	of	Adana,	Boyajian159 reports 
that	25,000	to	30,000	[Armenians]	were	“massacred”.	This	is	
158 J.R. Volhardt, “The Role of Social Psychology in Preventing 
Group-selective	Mass	Atrocities”,	in:	S.P.	Rosenberg,	T.	Galis,	A.	Zuck-
er (eds), Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention,	Cambridge	University	
Press,	New	York	2016,	p.	113.
159	D.	Boyajian,	The Case of the Forgotten Genocide,	Educational	
Book	Crafters,	Westwood,	NJ	1972,	p.	55.
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a conservative estimation is confirmed by other research-
ers.160	On	the	other	hand,	Yakut161 focuses on the “death toll 
in the Adana Prefecture and come out with a much small-
er	number	of	Armenian	victims	(under	5	220).	Even	within	
this approach it is obvious that the proportion of the vic-
tims	(Christians,	and	mainly	Armenians)	represents	81.6%	
while	the	casualties	of	Muslims	is	of	18.4%.	If	a	group	fights	
for its life one might expect that the aggressors will suffer 
too regardless the balance of forces. These data are repro-
duced by Sahara162	(using	the	work	of	Kemal	Yukut163). The 
table	2	reproduced	by	Sahara	refers	to	deaths	suffered	by	
“Muslims”	and	“Non-Muslims”	(p.	137)	that	implies	a	fun-
damental bias against Non-Muslims (Armenians, Greeks, 
Bulgarians	and	so	on	who	were	also	Christians	of	vari-
ous denominations). This means all the Non-Muslims are 
deprived by this so-called descriptive statistics of their iden-
tity	being	a	kind	of	“collective	nobody”.	Unfortunately,	this	
custom, even among professionals, to identify just one cate-
gory	(let	us	say	O)	and	to	refer	to	all	other	identities	of	var-
ious	ethnic	and	religious	groups	as	Non-O	is	a	structural	
bias that nullifies the right to one’s identity.
The second issue is that of violent patterns expressed 
along	the	history	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Long	before	the	
events	of	1896	and	1909	the	forced	conversion	to	Islam	
under the death threat has been a common practice of the 
Sublime	Porte	together	with	the	violence	against	Christian	
communities	perpetrated	by	Muslims	from	the	Ottoman	
Empire	who	had	different	ethnic	origins	that	the	Turks	
but followed the pattern established by the Sublime Por-
te. For instance, this is the practice of the execution, main-
ly	thorough	decapitation	of	Christian	rulers	(kings)	and	
160	R.H.	Kévorkian,	La Cilicie (1909–1921), les massacres d’Adana 
au mandat français. Revue D’histoire Arménienne Contemporaine, 
III, Paris 1999.
161	K.	Yakut,	Adana isyanı bőlgenin kalkındırıl yőnelik Osmanlı 
Hükümeti’nin aldığ őnlemler,	Ermeni	Araştırmaları	Türkiye	Kon-
gresi,	Avrasya	Stratejik	Araştırmalar	Merkezi,	Ermeni	Araştırmaları	
Enstitüsü,	Ankara	2007.
162 T. Sahara, What Happened in Adana in April 1909? Conflicting 
Armenian and Turkish Views,	Baskı	Isis,	Istanbul	2013,	pp.	137–138.
163	K.	Yakut,	Adana isyanı…,	p.	443.
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of	their	heirs	because	the	refused	to	be	converted	to	Islam:	
the	case	of	Constantin	Brâncoveanu	and	his	sons	decapi-
tated	in	Constantinople	in	1714.164 Same pattern surfaces 
in the case of the complete destruction of entire communi-
ties	as	the	city	of	Voskopojë	(1768–1788)	which	had	over	
12,000	houses,	being	a	wealthy	city	with	a	large	Chris-
tian population (many using a Romance language) with 
a	“New	Academy”	all	destroyed	by	Muslim	Albanians,	as	
documented by Peyfuss.165	In	1970	the	former	flourishing	
city	of	Voskopojë	was	just	a	small	village	with	only	500	
inhabitants as Peyfuss witnessed while visiting the place. 
Such	patterns	of	systematic	violence	across	the	Ottoman	
Empire	long	time	before	the	1909	events166, regardless their 
initial motives generated a violent political mindset that 
has	been	repeated	and	reinforced	up	to	1915	and	beyond.	
This pattern remains active also in the form of denial and 
through deep neglect toward the historical vestiges of the 
victims167).
The fact that within nowadays the Internet offers access 
to previously inaccessible information while denial continues 
to function and the official acknowledgment of the genocide 
by many powerful nations remains yet to be completed cre-
ates a global risk for what might be called the global moral 
capital. If the moral deficit (could we imagine an Interna-
tional	Moral	Bank?)	is	going	to	increase	we	should	expect	
that the immoral collective behaviors will increase.
Discussion
The conflicting representations on the Armenian genocide 
(1915–1923)	cannot	be	separated	from	macro-social	and	his-
torical factors among which the following are highly signifi-
cant. First, the natural rights of the first, or in any case the 
prior, settlers, in a given territory that becomes the physical 
164	See	Şincai,	Xenopol,	Iorga,	op.	cit.
165	D.M.	Peyfuss,	Chestiunea aromânească. Evoluţia ei de la orig-
ini până la pacea de la Bucureşti (1913) şi poziţia Austro-Ungariei, 
Editura	Enciclopedică,	Bucureşti	1974/1994,	p.	16.
166	F.	Gőçek	Müge,	Ottoman Past…
167 S. Iorga, op. cit.
226 | Cătălin Mamali, Mircea Kivu, Jan Kutnik |
field of atrocities, social injustices, cultural and symbolic 
violence perpetrated during long periods by the invaders 
(Turks,	Ottomans)	against	the	Armenians	who	did	exist	on	
most part of the land long time before the Turkish invasion. 
Second, the existence of secret plans to eliminate the Arme-
nian population through killing, deportation, starvation 
and deprivation of property (individual as well as collec-
tive). Third, the use and abuse of various ethnic groups, as 
the	Ottoman	Empire	had	a	multi-cultural	structure,	inclu-
sively at power levels, as executors of the genocidal actions. 
Fourth, the existence of precedent atrocities, such as those 
committed	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	since	1896,	against	the	
Armenians that have not been punished by international 
powers and institutions. Fifth, the explicit use of Armeni-
an Genocide as a societal model for mass violence by other 
collective actors such a as Nazis.
A main limitation of the present study is that despite 
the fact that the study provides data on a national repre-
sentative sample, it is not reliable to compare with conven-
ience samples from other countries and among them. This 
limitation is connected with the fact that the levels of rec-
ognition of the Armenian genocide varies across the world 
from	“outright	denial”	to	national	and	legal	recognition.	It	
is quite probable that the accuracy of basic knowledge on 
genocide might be influenced significantly be the cultural 
and political context of countries within which the Armeni-
an genocide is nationally recognized versus countries that 
refuse to do so. To answer to this question national repre-
sentative samples should be used for the entire spectrum, 
task that seems rather difficult today. At the same time it 
is reasonable assume that while the basic knowledge on 
the genocide will increase the pressure on political actors 
to switch from denial to recognition will increase too. The 
costs of denial168 should increase as the proportion of com-
mon people who have accurate basic knowledge on the gen-
ocide will increase.
168	R.S.	Lazarus,	“The	Costs	and	Benefits	of	Denial”,	in:	R.S.	Lazarus	
(ed.), Fifty Years of the Research and Theory of R. S. Lazarus: An 
Analysis of Historical and Perennial Issues (pp.	227–251),	Erlbaum,	
Mahwah,	N.J.	1998.
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From all convenience samples, five stand with the high-
est	accurate	historical	knowledge	of	1915	events:	a	group	
of	Croatian	students,	a	group	of	Californian	students	par-
ticipants to a course on cultural diversity, and a group 
of	Czech	and	international	researchers	in	liberal	arts	from	
a	Czech	University,	a	Bulgarian	group,	and	a	group	of	older	
professionals from Venezuela. In all cases it is evident that 
commemoration of the genocide contributed to an increase 
of	basic	public	knowledge	on	1915	events.	The	open	question	
is:	how	long	this	positive	impact	is	going	to	last?	To	answer	
that question, it is necessary to conduct more studies on 
representative national samples.
Panel studies on representative national samples 
(including the two sides of the conflict) carried out during 
3–10	years	are	necessary.	They	could	follow	other	critical	
social	events	(besides	100	year	commemoration)	to	iden-
tify changes and might be combined with experimental 
design in which smaller groups might be asked (experimen-
tal group) to carry out a self-organized documentation via 
(books	or/and	internet)	to	identify	changes	of	social	basic	
knowledge on genocide to be compared with groups that do 
not go through such self-organized documentation stimu-
late by the experimenter.
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ANNEX
Fig. 1. Representation of the levels moral becoming from one 
guided by moral principles to one guided by immoral principles
Explanation: The first 3 levels are those identified by Kohlberg. 
In addition are the 3 negative levels of immoral development: 
(–1) Pre-conventional immoral level: one generates undeserved 
pain in others and blocks others attempts to obtain pleasure and 
achieve personal pleasure and benefits; (–2) Conventional immoral 
norms; one obeys to existing immoral norms such as ethnocentric 
superiority, racisms, class discrimination, religious exclusion etc. 
The mutual expectations are construed in an exclusionist mode (”if 
we/I do not terminate them, then they will not let us to live”); the 
respected norms are clearly unjust and legislation is dehumaniz-
ing; (–3) At post-conventional level individuals and/or group con-
ceive auto-centric moral principles that promote their perceived 
well-being at the expenses, including cultural, financial, physical, 
religious annihilation of specific others.
240 | Cătălin Mamali, Mircea Kivu, Jan Kutnik |
Table 1. During history some people (groups, nations) have 
been victims to terrible atrocities that are named genocide. 
Do you know which people has been victim of genocide 
in 1915? Look to the following list and select just ONE pair that 
might represent the real answer. You have a list of possible 
perpetrators and victims. Only one possibility represents 
the true answer (circle item)
Perpetrators Victims
Time 1 – 2015 
Prior to 100 
years com-
memoration 
(N = 1231)
Time 2 – 2016 
Post the 100 
years com-
memoration 
(N = 1589)
Albanians Yugoslavians 
(Croatians)
1.3 .7
Algerians Tunisians 0.6 .3
Americans 
(USA)
Canadians 0.8 .2
Bulgarians Ottomans 
(Turks)
1.2 .7
British (UK) Maori (Noua 
Zeeland)
0.6 .0
Canadians Americans 
(USA)
.2 .2
Hungarians Slovenians 1.2 1.0
Ottomans 
(Turks)
Armenians 8.0 8.8
Yugoslavians 
(Serbs)
Romanians 2.6 2.1
Russians (Tsa-
rists)
Georgians 4.7 4.4
Slovenians Ungarians 1.5 .3
Spanish Mexicans 0.8 .1
Tajikistanis Russians (Tsa-
rists)
1.2 .6
Tunisian Algerians .2 .2
NONE of these groups 17.4 2.9
I do not know 57.5 77.3
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Table 1a. Right and wrong answers, by education degree
Education
2015 2016 Both waves
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Elementary 6% 6% 3% 6% 4% 2% 6% 5% 3%
High school 6% 6% 1% 7% 5% 2% 6% 5% 2%
University 16% 8% 3% 20% 11% 8% 18% 9% 5%
Table 2b. Information sources regarding the 1915 genocide 
(2016, multiple answers)
Source %
Books 23
TV 22
School 22
Internet 14
People (friends, colleagues, 
teachers) 12
Printed Press 6
Radio 2
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Table 3. Right and wrong answers, both waves
Question Answers 2015 2016
During history some people 
(groups, nations) have been 
victims to terrible atrocities 
that are named genocide. 
Do you know which 
people has been victim 
of genocide in 1915? Look 
to the following list and 
select just ONE pair that 
might represent the real 
answer. You have a list 
of possible perpetrators 
and victims. Only one 
possibility represents the 
true answer (circle it)
Ottomans (Turks) –
Armenians (actors) 8.0% 8.8%
Other pairs 34.5% 13.9%
Do not know 57.5% 77.3%
If you did select any answer 
(1 to 14) try to estimate 
how many victims have 
been killed (magnitude).
Approx. 1 milion 5.4% 3.6%
Approx. 1,5 milioane 2.4% 2.2%
Less 19.6% 10.2%
More 4.1% 5.0%
Do not know 68.5% 79.0%
Combined questions  
(correct answers)
Both (actors 
& magnitude) 2.2% 3.1%
One 10.0% 8.2%
None 87.8% 88.7%
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Participatory research on accuracy of knowledge on historical events
Self-inquiry method worked out by Cătălin Mamali (A)
Dear participant you are kindly invited to participate to a research focused 
on the accuracy of historical knowledge especially about tragic events. 
In contrast with the studies you might have been asked previously to par-
ticipate this time you are going to have an active interrogative role. This is 
to say that instead to answer pre-established questions designed by experts 
this time, you, based on your experience, knowledge, abilities to search are 
asked to generate, to produce questions. So, please be ready to ask any 
question that you might consider that it is important. Please go page by 
page. Do NOT read ahead.
Your answers are confidential and will be used only for research aims 
without any chance to disclose your identity. No money or other material 
rewards are provided for your free participation. Thank you for your vol-
unteer participation.
1. Stage 1 (some 10–20 minutes): Impersonal (gen-
eral level of self-inquiry, only the universe of dis-
course (the topic) is presented: We are attempting 
to study and understand the series of tragic historical 
events that did take place since 1915 and the following 
years in the Ottoman empire. Among these historical events 
some of historic importance involve the relations between 
the Turks and Armenians. The goal of the present research 
is to achieve an accurate representation about these events 
and to asses also the accuracy of the common knowledge 
about these events. This is why we need your help and 
are asking you to generate questions about this historical 
reality. There are various representations about these his-
torical events that can be ranged roughly between the fol-
lowing two opposite representations: (1) one that posits that 
the violent events produced in 1915 and the following years 
can be characterized as a conflict between the violent upris-
ing of the Armenians against Turkish (Ottoman) rule and 
the violent response of the Turkish forces for protecting the 
state (territory) integrity; (2) the other posits that the vio-
lent events of 1915 are a genocide against the Armenians 
who did attempt to protect their basic rights as a popula-
tion that historically did live on those territories long time 
before the arrival of the Turks. (The order of (1) and (2) 
is randomly reversed)
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Please be so kind and consider this difficult problem that concerns the accu-
racy of historical representations on major past events and think to any 
questions that are important for understanding this issue. Please, write 
down any questions that come to your mind because it could be of great help 
in our efforts to study the accuracy of representations on historical events.”
2. Second stage – that of inter-inquiry that might 
include a few phases
Stage 2, phase 1
Please think to the same problem: “We are attempt-
ing to study and understand the series of tragic histori-
cal events that did take place since 1915 and the following 
years in the Ottoman empire. Among these historical events 
some of historic importance involve the relations between 
the Turks and Armenians. The goal of the present research 
is to achieve the accurate representations about these events 
and to asses also the accuracy of the common knowledge 
about these events. This is why we need your help and are 
asking you to generate questions about this historical real-
ity. There are various representations about these histori-
cal events that can be ranged roughly between the following 
two opposite representations: (1) one that posits that the vio-
lent events produced in 1915 and the following years can 
be characterized as a conflict between the violent uprising 
of the Armenians against Turkish (Ottoman) rule and the 
violent response of the Turkish forces for protecting the state 
(territory) integrity; (2) the other posits that the violent 
events of 1915 are a genocide against the Armenians who 
did attempt to protect their basic rights as a population that 
historically did live on those territories long time before the 
arrival of the Turks.”
However, now we ask you to direct your questions toward any Armenian 
(reversed Turkish) authorities, representatives, persons that have been 
involved in 1915 in those events. Please write down any question that 
comes to your mind and specify to whom it is directed/addressed.
Stage 2, phase 2
Please think to the same problem: “We are attempt-
ing to study and understand the series of tragic histori-
cal events that did take place since 1915 and the following 
years in the Ottoman empire. Among these historical events 
some of historic importance involve the relations between 
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the Turks and Armenians. The goal of the present research 
is to achieve the accurate representations about these events 
and to asses also the accuracy of the common knowledge 
about these events. This is why we need your help and are 
asking you to generate questions about this historical real-
ity. There are various representations about these histori-
cal events that can be ranged roughly between the following 
two opposite representations: (1) one that posits that the vio-
lent events produced in 1915 and the following years can 
be characterized as a conflict between the violent uprising 
of the Armenians against Turkish (Ottoman) rule and the 
violent response of the Turkish forces for protecting the 
state (territory) integrity; (2) the other posits that the vio-
lent events of 1915 are a genocide against the Armenians 
who did attempt to protect their basic rights as a popula-
tion that historically did live on those territories long time 
before the arrival of the Turks.”
However now we ask you to direct your questions toward any Turkish 
(Ottoman) [reversed Armenian] authorities, representatives, persons that 
have been involved in 1915 in those events. Please write down any ques-
tion that comes to your mind and specify to whom it is directed/addressed.
Stages 2, phase 3
Please think to the same problem: “We are attempt-
ing to study and understand the series of tragic histori-
cal events that did take place since 1915 and the following 
years in the Ottoman empire. Among these historical events 
some of historic importance involve the relations between 
the Turks and Armenians. The goal of the present research 
is to achieve the accurate representations about these events 
and to asses also the accuracy of the common knowledge 
about these events. This is why we need your help and are 
asking you to generate questions about this historical real-
ity. There are various representations about these histori-
cal events that can be ranged roughly between the following 
two opposite representations: (1) one that posits that the vio-
lent events produced in 1915 and the following years can 
be characterized as a conflict between the violent uprising 
of the Armenians against Turkish (Ottoman) rule and the 
violent response of the Turkish forces for protecting the state 
(territory) integrity; (2) the other posits that the violent 
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events of 1915 are a genocide against the Armenians who 
did attempt to protect their basic rights as a population that 
historically did live on those territories long time before the 
arrival of the Turks.”
However, now we ask you to direct your questions toward any Armenian 
(Turkish) authorities, representatives, persons that discus today the 1915 
events. Please write down any question that comes to your mind and spec-
ify to whom it is directed/addressed.
Stages 2, phase 4
Please think to the same problem: “We are attempt-
ing to study and understand the series of tragic histori-
cal events that did take place since 1915 and the following 
years in the Ottoman empire. Among these historical events 
some of historic importance involve the relations between 
the Turks and Armenians. The goal of the present research 
is to achieve the accurate representations about these events 
and to asses also the accuracy of the common knowledge 
about these events. This is why we need your help and are 
asking you to generate questions about this historical real-
ity. There are various representations about these histori-
cal events that can be ranged roughly between the following 
two opposite representations: (1) one that posits that the vio-
lent events produced in 1915 and the following years can 
be characterized as a conflict between the violent uprising 
of the Armenians against Turkish (Ottoman) rule and the 
violent response of the Turkish forces for protecting the state 
(territory) integrity; (2) the other posits that the violent 
events of 1915 are a genocide against the Armenians who 
did attempt to protect their basic rights as a population that 
historically did live on those territories long time before the 
arrival of the Turks.”
However, now we ask you to direct your questions toward any Turkish 
authorities, representatives, persons that discus today the 1915 events. 
Please write down any question that comes to your mind and specify 
to whom it is directed/addressed.
Stage 3 explicit self-focused inquiry
Please think to the same problem: “We are attempt-
ing to study and understand the series of tragic histori-
cal events that did take place since 1915 and the following 
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years in the Ottoman empire. Among these historical events 
some of historic importance involve the relations between 
the Turks and Armenians. The goal of the present research 
is to achieve the accurate representations about these events 
and to asses also the accuracy of the common knowledge 
about these events. This is why we need your help and are 
asking you to generate questions about this historical real-
ity. There are various representations about these histori-
cal events that can be ranged roughly between the following 
two opposite representations: (1) one that posits that the vio-
lent events produced in 1915 and the following years can 
be characterized as a conflict between the violent uprising 
of the Armenians against Turkish (Ottoman) rule and the 
violent response of the Turkish forces for protecting the state 
(territory) integrity; (2) the other posits that the violent 
events of 1915 are a genocide against the Armenians who 
did attempt to protect their basic rights as a population that 
historically did live on those territories long time before the 
arrival of the Turks.”
However, now we ask you to direct your questions to your own self. Express 
questions that you might feel to be very important from your own view-
point, knowledge and feelings about the 1915.
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